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Abstract 
 
In 2013, France sent more than $3 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
to the African continent. The biggest aid recipients were Senegal and Morocco, both 
former members of the short-lived French Union. Senegal was fully colonized in 
nineteenth century, and Morocco was established as a protectorate in 1912. Although 
Senegal was an outlier in French West Africa because of the status of the originaires 
as French citizens in the Four Communes, it lacked full sovereignty until 1960. On 
the other hand, France was not the sovereign entity in Morocco due to the preexisting 
legitimacy of the sultan’s rule. This discrimination continued during the French 
Union as colonies (both old and new), protectorates, and mandates had varying 
numbers of representation based on their assigned roles. Although official 
colonization ended over fifty years ago, the presence of the French, through 
Françafrique, has remained. Françafrique is the post-colonial French policy in Africa 
that included a mix of covert and official networks between French and African 
actors. Under the guise of Françafrique, France has frequently led military 
interventions and upheld specific monetary agreements with the CFA Zone. 
Françafrique has varied based on the acceptance of African heads of state. Because of 
this, variation in French identity can be observed through the channels of 
Françafrique. In this thesis, I argue that levels of “Frenchness,” an index composed 
from the remnants of identity from colonialism and Françafrique, determine French 
bilateral aid allocations to former colonies in Africa.   
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 “Classic colonialism may be dead, but France continues to be the political and 
economic epicenter of its former colonies.”1 
 
The official French website (France Diplomatie) for bilateral aid provides 
statistics and specific country information that allude to the generosity of the French 
government. With quotes like “France provides 10% of global ODA, [Official 
Development Assistance, OECD] despite its economy only accounting for 4% of the 
world’s GDP,” the French government attempts to portray a France that supports 
global development in lower income nations.2 The largesse again appears: “the 
international target of ODA equivalent to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) by 
2015 has not been met by France, whose rate of 0.45% of GNI is nonetheless above 
the global average of 0.31%.”3 In other words, the French government has yet to meet 
the target goal but still fares better than most other developed countries. Although the 
statistics and themes of French generosity are valid as France provides more bilateral 
aid than other developed countries, they do not provide a complete account of why 
Paris gives aid to developing countries. More than altruism, France distributes aid in 
order to further strategic interests, both maintaining their sphere of influence and 
increasing access to world markets. Because the role of French influence prompts aid 
allocation, scholars have argued and statistically illustrated that historical 
                                                
1 Frank J. Prial, “France Seeking Closer African Ties,” The New York Times, September 23, 1981, 
accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/23/world/france-seeking-closer-african-
ties.html. 
2 “French bilateral aid,” France Diplomatie, December 23, 2013, accessed April 14, 2013, 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/french-assistance-
institutional/french-assistance-delivery/article/french-bilateral-aid. 
3 Ibid. 
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relationships, like colonialism, are a key determinant of aid receipts.4 Although most 
developing countries receive bilateral aid from France, those with colonial history 
receive a greater proportion, which is illustrated in Figure 1.5  
 
Figure 1. French ODA in 2011, millions of USD 
 
Previous scholarship fails to consider the variations within the French colonial 
empire, as well as post-independent relationships. This thesis contributes to 
                                                
4 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5.1 (2000): 33-63; Jean-Claude Berthelemy, “Bilateral donors’ interest vs. 
recipients’ development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same?” Cahiers de Maison 
des Sciences Economiques (2005): 1-36; Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, “What determines 
foreign aid? The donors’ perspective,” Journal of Development Economics 87 (2008): 1-13; Paul 
Collier and David Dollar, “Aid allocation and poverty reduction,” European Economic Review 46 
(2002): 1475-1500; Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, “Motivations for Aid to Developing 
Countries,” World Development 12.9 (1984): 879-900; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, “The French Aid 
Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964-70,” 
Development and Change 3(1978): 459-78; Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” 
Economics and Politics (1985): 275-297; Javed Younas, “Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: 
Altruism or trade benefits,” European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008): 661-674. 
5 “Profiles and policies of bilateral donors: France,” OECD, 2012, accessed April 21, 2017, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/France_DCR2012_21jan13_Part8.pdf. 
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postcolonial studies and culture studies, as I provide additional understanding about 
the relationship between the West and the developing world and how the historical 
relations between them have shaped the present. In this thesis, I expand upon the 
existing literature by disaggregating the French colonial relationships and 
emphasizing the importance of Françafrique in present-day French-Africa relations. I 
argue that identity, primarily identity of belonging to the “in-group” of France, is the 
main driver of aid. Identity is more influential than altruism or the support of 
democratic norms, good governance, and human rights for French bilateral aid 
allocation, although these are also minor motivations. Françafrique, as will be 
presented in detail in Chapter 2, is the official yet covert policy of most French 
administrations, which is comprised of various networks among corporations, French 
politicians, and African heads of state. Françafrique is a form of neocolonialism, 
where French actors attempt to influence and manage African heads of state in 
exchange for access to natural resources and a solidified sphere of influence. By 
clarifying the colonial relationships that were dependent on identity, I show how 
regional and individual statuses shaped the French Empire. For example, the 
originaires—who were a privileged group of Africans that were granted voting rights 
in the nineteenth century—had a greater sense of political belonging within the 
French Empire and therefore had a more French “identity.” 
In addition to presenting a detailed history of French colonization and the 
mechanisms of Françafrique, I create an index to measure the amount of “Frenchness” 
present in each African nation-state. “Frenchness” is the shared identity between 
France and former French colonies and is composed of political, economic, and social 
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factors. “Frenchness” varies according to relations with France and includes non-
former French colonies. Although the French Empire did not colonize all of Africa, 
many countries have interacted with France, either during colonization or in the 
policies of Françafrique. “Frenchness” is created using principal component analysis, 
which constructs an index based on the colonial history and the presence of 
Françafrique in each country. This will be further explained in chapter 3.   
 The remainder of this introduction will provide a historical background of the 
aid relationship between France and Africa and establish the relevant identity theory 
necessary for evaluating its use in determining aid. 
 
Franco-African Aid Relationship 
Prior to the end of colonialism, aid allocations were concentrated between 
Western nations. Empires were responsible for financing their colonial possessions, 
and other nations could not intervene financially or militarily. In the immediate 
postwar era, the discourse around colonial possessions shifted. Following the Atlantic 
Charter and the right for self-determination, colonial powers argued for the right to 
keep their territorial possessions in order to facilitate state building and development. 
In 1946, the French government created the Fonds d’Investissement pour le 
Développement Economique et Social (Investment Fund for Economic and Social 
Development or FIDES) to finance development projects in colonial territories.6 This 
                                                
6 Great Britain created a similar development fund through the British Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940 in response to criticism from the United States and the Atlantic Charter. Frederick 
Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
36. 
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fund altered the previous financing of territories by transferring responsibility from 
the colonies themselves to the metropole.7  
In addition to financing development in its colonies, President de Gaulle 
proposed an increasing role for Africans in French institutions through the French 
Union. The French Assembly proposed the French Union, and later the French 
Community, as a compromise between colonial possession and full-fledged state. The 
French Union was the end of the French Empire and transferred power from French 
to African hands. Under the creation of the French Union, all Africans had a vote and 
direct representation in the French Assembly, and many soon-to-be African heads of 
states served as representatives. However, the French Union failed to appease the 
demands of African actors, and independence movements ensued in 1958 when 
Guinea declined to participate in the French Community. The implementation of the 
colonial development fund and the proposal of the French Union were in direct 
response to United Nations negotiations as “France and Britain feared pressures to 
apply the model of mandates to all colonies.”8 
After former French colonies gained their independence, France signed 
bilateral treaties with the goal of state building and the maintenance of French 
influence. Not surprisingly given the historical, exploitative nature of colonialism, 
these treaties primarily benefited the donor country through high interest loans and 
unfair access to natural resources. These bilateral treaties make up one aspect of 
Françafrique and attempts for control through neocolonialist policies. The de Gaulle 
                                                
7 Kevin Shillington, ed., The Encyclopedia of African History: Volume 1, A-G, (New York: Fitzroy 
Dearborn, 2005), 905. 
8 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 
1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 39. 
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administration initially prioritized former possessions in terms of networks and trade 
negotiations because of the existing influence France had in former colonies, or the 
level of “Frenchness.” However, subsequent French administrations have expanded to 
other African states and attempted to facilitate a French influence in former Belgian, 
British, and Portuguese colonies. This expansion has occasionally resulted in closer 
ties and lower level of “Frenchness” when non-former colonies join French 
institutions, like la Francophonie and the CFA franc zone, as will be analyzed in 
Chapter 2.  
  
Identity Theory 
In order to argue that identity matters for aid allocation, it is necessary to 
clarify what I mean by identity. In this section, I outline the relevant international 
relations theory, borrowed from constructivist literature, and I refer back to this 
theory to illustrate specific identity formation in the following chapters. 
Constructivism is a theoretical framework within international relations theory that 
emphasizes how international actors are socialized through norms, rules, and 
practices.9 In opposition to realist theory, which advocates that power and material 
capabilities are the most important factors in understanding why states behave in 
certain ways, constructivism instead proposes how social constructs and 
understandings of such influence state behavior. Identity “references mutually 
                                                
9 Constructivist theory states, “(a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not 
simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or ‘intersubjective’ 
beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and 
identities of purposive actors.” Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The 
Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review 
of Political Science 4 (2001): 393. 
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constructed and evolving images of the self and other.”10 The construct of identity is 
important as it clarifies how and to what extent France and former colonies engage 
with each other and perceive one another, both historically and contemporarily. 
Social identities are “cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine ‘who I 
am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared 
understandings and expectations.”11  From this literature, we know that identity 
changes slowly and is based on historical interactions between states, as well as 
norms and behaviors. International relations theory also claims that identity is socially 
constructed and dependent upon the shared understanding between two states. 
International relations theory, as well as economic theory on identity, is 
essential for understanding why France has consistently intervened in former colonies. 
The relationship between France and French West or Equatorial Africa is based on an 
identity where the other “is an extension of the self.”12 According to the constructivist 
literature, identity is socially constructed and based on shared understandings 
between two individuals, or states in this instance.13 Identity distinguishes between 
that of the self (the state) and the other, which can result in an in-group and out-group 
categorization, where those belonging to the in-group receive privileged treatment 
from various French actors, both political and economic. The French government has 
most often considered some African states, both during colonization and post-
                                                
10 Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 59. 
11 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” The American 
Political Science Review 88.2 (1994): 395. 
12 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 386. 
13 In the constructivist literature, this is often referred to as intersubjective understanding. 
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independence, to be within the French sphere of influence or pré carré.14 Those with 
collective identity—a group level identity that shares expectations and behavior—
begin to consider each other’s welfare when making decisions. As President Giscard 
d’Estaing has famously said French policy is “help for friends first.”15 African heads 
of state that align with French presidents belong to the in-group and receive special 
treatment, such as the special relationship between President Omar Bongo of Gabon 
and six different French administrations. However, when members of the in-group 
violate this collective identity, other members may reject said member.16  
Furthermore, identity is dependent upon history, as previous interactions with 
other states form the present relationship between two or more states.17 The result of 
interactions in identity formation is evident in Chapters 1 and 2, which detail the 
colonial history and policy of Françafrique. Various French actors have interacted 
with African actors since the mid-fifteenth century. These interactions have not 
always been viewed positively, but the accumulated history has led to modern 
understandings of the relationship between French and African actors. This French-
African relationship continued to form during the post-colonial period, as will be 
made clear in Chapter 2. Although not immune to change, identity changes slowly 
based on interactions and perceived interests.18 One of the main conclusions from the 
constructivist literature is that identity shapes interests, and such interests can lead to 
                                                
14 pré carré is often translated as the backyard of France but refers to the French sphere of influence. 
15 Flora Lewis, “France Seeking Wider Influence Among Africans,” The New York Times, August 1, 
1977, accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/01/archives/france-seeking-wider-
influence-among-africans-6-france-focuses.html?_r=0. 
16 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Economics and Identity,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115.3 (2000): 725. 
17 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 385.  
18 Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-
Colonial Families of Nations,” European Journal of International Relations 8.2 (2002): 267. 
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specific actions by individuals and states.19 Because of this element of interaction, 
France, based on its historical role and identity as a dominant power in Africa, 
provides aid to its former colonies based on the identity facilitated throughout 
colonialism and neocolonialism.20 Some argue that France has an obligation and 
moral responsibility, due to colonization, to continue investing in democracy and the 
economies of former colonies.21 However, I argue that it is the notion of identity, 
rather than the promotion of democracy and economic growth, that determines 
foreign aid. 
States seek ontological security or the security of the self, which guides states’ 
behaviors and upholds specific identities in an attempt to avoid future uncertainty.22 If 
states prioritize self-preservation and collective identity changes slowly, then this 
provides an explanation for why France has continued neocolonial practices despite 
international criticism. French administrations have internalized an interventionist 
norm in Africa, rooted in colonial history. In recent years, France has faced scandals 
for both supporting authoritarian regimes and harboring wealth of such authoritarian 
leaders. However, this has only slightly, if at all, shifted French policy in Africa. In 
addition to being motivated by these norms, France is influenced by domestic and 
                                                
19 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 385; Brysk, Parsons, and 
Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 270. 
20 Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 267. 
21 “The glory days are passing,” The Economist, December 13, 2006, accessed October 23, 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/node/8417979. 
22 According to constructivist literature, “Ontological security refers to the need to experience oneself 
as whole, continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realize the 
sense of agency… Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves. Some, deep 
forms of uncertainty threaten this identity security… Where an actor has no idea what to expect, she 
cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear how to pursue her ends. Since ends 
are constitutive of identity, in turn, deep uncertainty renders the actor’s identity insecure. Individuals 
are therefore motivated to create cognitive and behavioral certainty, which they do by establishing 
routines.” Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security,” 
European Journal of International Relations 12.3 (2006): 342. 
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international expectations, rules, and cost-benefit analyses. 23  Together, these 
theoretical concepts explain why France continuously seeks world power status and 
why France gives a significant portion of French GDP as aid.24 The international 
community expects France—based on historical relationships, the French level of 
development, their position on the UN Security Council, the use of conditionalities, 
etc.—to give aid as appropriate. Due to the persistence of history, the international 
community further expects France to initiate intervention when former colonies turn 
to violence.25 Because France has internalized paternalistic actions as a norm or 
identity, the “aid relationship has persisted with little change despite the progressive 
normalization of underlying economic ties of trade and investment.”26  
An evaluation of potential consequences does not fully explain why France 
favors specific former colonies with a similar identity over others amid criticism by 
the international community.27 France has consistently showed favoritism towards 
African heads of state that belong to the in-group. In recent years, however, France 
has experienced reputational consequences for favoring influence and relationships 
                                                
23 This section draws upon constructivist literature on logic of appropriateness and logic of 
consequences, as defined in this footnote. Both logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences 
guide policies concerning aid in its former colonies. Logic of appropriateness is choosing an action that 
is both rule-based and essential to a particular conception of the self. Logic of consequences is where 
actors “choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal and collective 
objectives.” Although logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences can be mutually exclusive, 
this is not the case for French policy towards Africa. French policy-makers are guided by both logics 
as the decision-making process includes the conservation of norms and a cost-benefit analysis of 
international and domestic expectations. James March and Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics 
of the International Political Orders,” International Organization 52.4 (1998): 949. 
24 March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of the International Political Orders,” 951.  
25 Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 270. 
26 Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 277. 
27 March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of the International Political Orders,” 949. 
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over democratic principles and human rights. 28  These reputational costs were 
prominent during the Elf scandal in the early 1990s, when the national oil company 
was accused of supporting authoritarian regimes that in turn funded French political 
campaigns.29 Furthermore, France has been accused of contributing to the lag in 
democratic development among French-speaking countries by propping up these 
authoritarian regimes that allow secret economic deals and an French interference in 
African domestic affairs.30 The presence of such criticisms illustrate why France has 
slowly begun to shift towards “political conditionalities” amid pressure from the 
international community.31  
 Identity is not singularly composed, and there are hierarchies of identities 
within an individual, state, or region. For example, some of France’s identities are 
rooted in membership in institutions, like the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and the European Union (EU), whereas other identities are constituted 
through values, such as the support of democracy and human rights. Although French 
identity incorporates French exceptionalism and Françafrique, these uniquely French 
identities may conflict with a European Union identity that advocates for an “ever 
closer union” and consistent multilateral aid approaches. The EU consistently 
practices aid contingency as a means for promoting democratic norms and good 
                                                
28 Piet Benoit, “Françafrique: The evolution of France’s interference in Africa,” Al Arabiya English, 
August 26, 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/ 
08/26/Fran-afrique-The-evolution-of-France-s-interference-in-Africa.html. 
29 “The French African Connection,” Al Jazeera, April 7, 2014, accessed April 14, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.html.  
30 Craig R. Whitney, “France Snips at the Old Ties that Bind It to Africa,” The New York Times, July 
25, 1997, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/25/world/france-snips-at-
the-old-ties-that-bind-it-to-africa.html. 
31 Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New 
Millennium (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2011), 68. 
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governance, and French administrations have struggled to reconcile these differences 
with their policy of rewarding friends irrespective of democratic and human rights 
violations. However, French bilateral aid allocations are under the jurisdiction of the 
French government. Because of this structure, French aid institutions are influenced 
by EU multilateral agencies but not forced to alter their behavior. However, these 
repeated interactions may over time alter the current policies of the French aid. The 
primary lessons from identity theory that matter for aid receipts are as follows: (1) 
identity is formed through repeated interaction and changes slowly; (2) those with 
collective identity behave differently; and (3) identity also influences state behavior, 
in additional to material capabilities. For the purpose of this thesis, identity is the 
understanding of the self (the state), and therefore the approach towards appropriate 
actions in a given situation based on such perceived identity. France, as a state, 
perceives its identity as a world power and furthers this status by creating spheres of 
influence based on shared French identity in former colonies.  
 
Chapter Summary  
French bilateral aid to former colonies is motivated by a variety of factors, 
including material gains, reputational hazard, and international norms. Despite these 
factors, identity is the most prominent determinant of French foreign aid to former 
colonies. By this, I mean a unique French identity that was established throughout 
colonization and facilitated through the channels of Françafrique, as will be presented 
in subsequent chapters.  
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In Chapter 1, I argue that a French “identity” was formed within the French 
colonial empire through the use of regional and individual statuses, which facilitated 
a closer relationship with French institutions, culture, and language. Regional 
statuses—department, colony, mandate, and protectorate—clarify the different 
approaches to French colonial rule in various territories. The French Colonial 
Empires granted individual, or person-level, statuses to Africans. These individual 
statuses are sujets, tirailleurs, originaires, métis, and évolués. In Chapter 2, I posit 
that the various channels of Françafrique, which were established post-independence, 
have continued to influence the “Frenchness” of African heads of states and other 
African actors. Finally, in Chapter 3, I present the economic analysis to test my 
overall hypothesis that identity of former colonies, formed throughout colonialism 
and influenced by Françafrique, is a key determinant in French bilateral aid allocation.  
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Chapter 1: Historical French-African Relations 
 
French explorers arrived on the African continent in 1445 at the mouth of the 
river in present-day Senegal and eventually established the first settler community of 
Saint-Louis in 1659.32 The French quickly began to export slaves as part of the 
transatlantic slave trade and have continued to exploit Africa’s natural resources and 
fertile soil ever since. Much has changed in the last three hundred years, but French 
presence has stayed constant, despite the official end of French colonialism and the 
formation of independent African nation-states. France has frequently intervened in 
the economic and political affairs of various African nations, under the guise of 
foreign aid and international institutions, of not only its former African colonies but 
also colonies formerly under British, German, Belgian and Portuguese rule.  
International relations theory, as was established in the introduction, asserts 
that identities are socially constructed, plastic, and shaped by the understanding of 
identity amongst states.33 States can possess multiple identities, which depend on both 
historical relationships and the present-day day socio-political environment. 
Interactions between states and individuals create a shared, or collective, identity. 
Identity, defined in this manner, is essential to the relationships of Franco-Africa as 
the colonial institutions, which subsequently bind the economic and political spheres, 
shaped it. Regional identities—colony, department, protectorate, or mandate—are 
facilitated based on the level of autonomy within the region. Political rights and a 
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sense of belonging within the French Empire fostered a French “identity.” At the 
individual (or person) level, France discriminated based on citizenship status: sujets, 
tirailleurs, originaires, méits, or assimilés. Each status had rights or duties in the 
French Empire. Political rights were hinged upon voting rights, education, and legal 
courts, which contributed to a sense of “Frenchness” among individual persons.  
This chapter will provide the historical background essential to understanding 
how French colonization is relevant to the Franco-African aid relationship in the 
present. Based on existing economic literature investigating the long-term impacts of 
historical institutions, like colonial history and the specific colonial ruler⎯Belgium, 
France, Great Britain, or Portugal⎯have significant consequences for economic 
growth in the present.34 Furthermore, these institutions and histories are “persistent,” 
meaning that they have long-term effects that spillover into the present.35 This is 
observed in the variations between countries who provide substantial aid but lack 
colonial history and former colonizers, especially France, which gives “to former 
colonies tied by political alliances without much regard to other factors, including 
poverty levels or choice of politico-economic regimes.”36  
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In this chapter, I argue that discrimination of status resulted in a particular 
sense of political belonging within the French Empire. This sense of political 
belonging, based on participation and access to rights, created a French “identity” 
among those who belonged to the French Empire. First, I will provide a brief 
description of the policies of assimilation, association and other French colonial 
practices, as well as mise en valeur (development or improvement). Then, I will 
illustrate how the variation in such policies at the level of the individual person 
followed by differences at the regional level, represented by each colony. Lastly, I 
will detail the role of each territory in the formation of the French Union, as well as 
the beginnings of the relationships between newly independent nations and their 
former colonizer.  
 
Assimilation and Association 
Before we delve into the current Franco-African relations, it is essential to 
understand how the historical relationship between France and Africa could have 
lasting effects with the potential to impact contemporary identity. First, I analyze the 
historical context of the beginnings and end of colonization with specific attention to 
how colonists attempted to create Africans with a French identity through the policy 
of assimilation (assimilation). Although France had a grip on the African continent in 
the fifteenth century, the greater colonization effort took place following the Berlin 
Conference in 1895, which specified the rules for claiming African lands as an 
official colony. France, at this point in time, was competing for possessions in interior 
Africa with other European powers⎯Britain, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. 
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Unlike other European powers, who favored indirect rule or rule by corporation, 
France ruled its colonies directly, by using French administration rather than existing 
chiefs to administer its colonial objectives. This rule was furthered by the policies of 
assimilation and la mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission).  
Assimilation was influenced by French rationalism and the thought that 
science could be the “key to regenerating humanity.”37 French colonial possessions 
were sometimes viewed as “laboratories” for understanding how “savages” could 
become civilized. This was the policy of la mission civilisatrice, where Frenchmen 
argued that the spread of the principles of republicanism and rationalism could bring 
about civilized cultures. Assimilation defended the notion that the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, an ideology heavily influential in the French Revolution, were 
“applicable everywhere, since it was thought that if men were given equal 
opportunity they would become civilized, rational, and free.”38 Many thought the 
differences in development between cultures was not necessarily due to a biological 
difference but a lack of access to rational and republican principles. La mission 
civilisatrice was both a justification for colonialism and an obligation to civilize the 
African savages. The implementation of assimilation resulted in the initial formations 
of a French identity as “colonization was expected to produce Africans with French 
cultural values.”39 It would be accomplished through education, labor participation, 
and mise en valeur, which was the rational development of natural and human 
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resources.40 Assimilation, if successfully implemented, would result in French-like 
citizens, while mise en valeur led to subjects who were both loyal to the French 
Empire and productive members of society. Although this approach of la mission 
civilisatrice has been evaluated with modern conceptions of ‘race,’ it was the 
dominant theory at the time of colonization and will not be evaluated on its ethical 
integrity but rather its importance in establishing identity.  
 
Mise en valeur 
At the beginning of French colonization, mise en valeur represented the 
development of the colonies particularly in terms of the construction of railroads and 
telecommunications network, but as French rule in Africa continued, mise en valeur 
shifted to include education, agriculture, health, and trade with the metropole. Despite 
the benevolent appearance in promoting education and health for Africans, behind the 
façade was French self-interest. Health improvements for Africans were implemented 
to protect colonial administrators living in close proximity to Africans and to protect 
settlers, especially in Algeria.41 Additionally, education, in the French language, used 
en faire des homes utiles (the creation of useful men), meaning that Africans in 
French-like schools would be trained as an educated labor force to be manipulated by 
French officials for better production and resource extraction. 42  Furthermore, 
“agricultural instruction was to be the main focus of the village school,” in order to 
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make the most productive use of the African population.43 Trade has clear economic 
implications, especially with the monopoly that France held over Africa. Additionally, 
mise en valeur argued that civilization needed to alleviate poverty alongside 
development of the colonies.44 In order to accomplish the motives of mise en valeur, 
France frequently used military force to pacify its subjects. Although prone to 
adaptation, mise en valeur was practiced throughout French colonial rule in Africa, 
under the policies of both assimilation and association. 
 
Education 
 Education was a primary means for imposing a French identity upon both 
citizens and subjects in French West and Equatorial Africa. However, access to 
education was not evenly distributed throughout the colonies and often favored areas 
where colonial ministers and their families resided. Because of this variation in 
accessibility and the kinds of schooling, colonial residents interacted with the French 
in various ways and created different levels of “Frenchness.” Three levels of schools 
possessed separate curricula to fulfill a specific purpose.45 The most basic level of 
education was for autochthonous Africans, who were able to attend village schools 
for 2-3 years of rudimentary instruction from African teachers. Village schools were 
both “of and for the masses.”46 The purpose of village schools was to create loyal 
subjects or civilized peoples rather than patriotic citizens, which was the motivation 
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behind education in the metropole.47 A slightly improved version of the village school 
was the regional school. Students were selected to attend such schools in order to 
further mise en valeur, as these institutions trained Africans in practical skills, like 
agriculture and trade. Upon completion of the curricula and proof of some French 
fluency, students received certificates of their professional studies instead of degrees. 
In addition to supporting the constant need for African workers in the colonies, 
French administrators, especially the governor general, believed that education could 
also “engender support for French rule” and prevent rebellions. 48  The most 
prestigious school in colonial Africa was the urban school, which closely resembled 
schooling in mainland France and primarily concentrated in the Quatre Communes of 
Senegal. Urban schools were primarily available to children of French administrators, 
métis (mulattos), and originaires (a unique type of French citizenship for Africans 
living in the Four Communes). The curricula followed that of France, and students 
were taught primarily by Europeans in only the French language.49 Unlike the British 
colonial education system, French schools were nonreligious and publicly funded.50 
 
Association 
This assimilationist policy shifted over time to one of association, where 
Africans could, in theory, evolve within their own cultures and avoid a forced 
assimilation, which was viewed critically by the international community. 
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Association, implemented in the early twentieth century, advocated that African 
customs should be fostered as long as they did not conflict with the ideas of French 
civilization. The concept of association is built on two intertwined premises:  
the first was that some form of sharing power with the old and new elite in 
West Africa was necessary to preserve French authority. The second was that 
power sharing, in the proper doses surrounded by the proper safeguards, was 
also in the best interests of its subjects and thus consistent with France’s 
civilizing mission in West Africa.51  
 
Despite its positive language, association policy was likely caused by the strain on 
French administrators and the French government to finance the implementation of 
assimilation. Association is present in the foreign policy approach of Françafrique as 
France constantly intervenes in the economic, political, and military situations in 
francophone Africa with the subtle notion of evolving African civilization within its 
own culture.  
In the end, the outcomes of the policy of assimilation and la mission 
civilisatrice were different for each territory and the classification of such within the 
French Empire. Assimilation was a universal policy for all French colonies, but it was 
applied to varying degrees depending on the needs and purpose of each colony. The 
uneven effects of assimilation can be best observed in the number of Africans who 
achieved French citizenship. For example, in Algeria in 1944, less than one percent of 
the population had been granted citizenship, which was considered one of the more 
successful cases.52 Some colonies, such as Senegal, had thousands of citizens in 
addition to the originaires, whereas others in central Africa were denied such status, 
as they were less “French” than others based on their limited interaction with French 
                                                
51 Conklin, A Mission to Civilize, 188. 
52 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 
1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 29. 
 
22 
officials and the differing levels of education. However, it is clear that former French 
colonies perceived themselves as more “française” than their British counterparts felt 
they belonged to the Commonwealth. 53  With this basic understanding of the 
overarching themes and policies of French colonization, through the enforcement of 
assimilation and association, the next essential step is to complicate the story by 
looking at the individual and colony-level discrepancies in applying such policies, 
which further contributes to the “in-group” countries of francophone Africa. 
 
Identity at the Individual Level 
Until the Lamine Guèye law in 1946⎯which on paper granted citizenship to 
every resident in a French territory, including women⎯individual categorization of 
colonial residents determined their access to resources such as education, health, and 
political representation or office. Africans were separated into two broad groups: (1) 
subjects and (2) citizens. However, this grouping would combine originaires and 
métis and Frenchmen into one classification, which obscures the diversity and 
privilege within each group and also disregards the special place of African soldiers, 
or tirailleurs, within the French Empire. Because Frenchmen are simply citizens from 
France residing in Africa, most likely as businessmen or working for colonial 
administration, it is not necessary to analyze their place of privilege or their access to 
education and welfare programs, as they represented the highest status by directly 
belonging to the French race. The status of individual classification portrays the 
variable levels of “Frenchness” that remain in former African colonies today, which 
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is a remnant of these historical identities at the individual level. Because each 
individual status had particular interactions with French settlers and administrators as 
well as access to French services—education, legal rights, government positions, 
etc.—these person-level statuses yielded varying degrees of “Frenchness.” The 
identities will be discussed in the order of their level of “Frenchness,” with 
originaires, evolués, and métis possessing a similar level of “Frenchness” but in 
different ways, such as language or access to education.  
 
Sujets 
Sujets were the most elemental members within the French territories, and 
they had little access to the resources that France theoretically provided. Sujets 
possessed duties to the French Republic rather than rights within it.54 Access to 
education beyond primary school was scarce, as French facilities were not extended 
to many villages or rural areas. Most of the schools were near coastal cities or settler 
areas, except the village schools that focused on mise en valeur. Additionally, sujets 
were further distinguished under a separate court of law known as the indigénat 
(native courts). The indigénat was one of the most discriminatory institutions for the 
“lesser” members of a French territory. Although the French advocated that the 
indigénat was a way for Africans to remain under their cultural laws and traditions, 
the court instead  
consisted of regulations that allowed colonial administrators to inflict punishment on 
African subjects without obtaining a court judgment or approval from the metropolis. 
It allowed the colonial officers to jail any African for up to two years without trial, to 
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impose heavy taxes and punitive fines, or to burn the villages of those who refused to 
pay.55  
 
This court resulted in unfair and extreme punishment for minor crimes committed by 
sujets. Furthermore, sujets were completely excluded from the right to law in a 
French court, unless they had been naturalized. They also lacked any voting rights, 
including indirect voting through representation. 
 
Tirailleurs 
Tirailleurs often existed in between the subject and the citizen because 
promised rights and statuses were not always granted. Tirailleurs were African 
soldiers responsible for protecting French colonies, both in Africa and Indochina and 
fighting for France in World War I and World War II.56 These soldiers remained 
subjects but were no longer under the jurisdiction of the indigénat.57 The tirailleurs 
originated in the favored colony of Senegal in 1857 and were originally used to 
diminish revolts and strikes in other French colonies, including Algeria and Indochina. 
At the advent of the World War I, soldiers were recruited from the remaining colonies 
in French West Africa and Central Africa, typically from a low social status or forced 
by the local chief as a bargaining tool with the French administration. Chiefs and 
chefs de canton could obtain special benefits, as well as limited power in their 
respective canton, based on the number of soldiers they provided for French-African 
                                                
55 George B.N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 83.  
56 Tirailleurs were originally called tirailleurs Sénégalaise because they were first recruited from 
Senegal. However, as the demand for soldiers increased, tirailleurs were recruited from all French 
territories. 
57 Gregory Mann, “What Was the Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” Journal of 
African History 50 (2009): 344. 
 
25 
troops. During World War I, over 200,000 men from the African colonies fought for 
France. As further evidence of the discriminatory policy and the importance of 
identities, sujets and originaires of tirailleurs statuses were split into separate 
regiments. Originaires fought alongside other French troops as citizens, whereas sujet 
soldiers fought in all black regiments or all Arab regiments known as spahis. 
Originaires belonging to the regular French army had access to goods and services 
equal to that of the French military, as Table 1.1. 58 clearly reveals. 
 
Table 1.1. Service conditions for originaires and other Africans, 1915 
Condition Originaires in regular army Colonial troops 
 
Service liability Initial three-year enlistment Same 
Pay Same as French soldiers One-half originaires’ pay 
Quarters Barracks, with bed No provision for beds; sleep on 
ground or floor; blankets 
issued 
Food European food; food allowance 
3.76 francs per ration 
Traditional African food 
prepared by Senegalese 
women accompanying the 
troops; allowance 1.68 francs 
per ration 
Promotion Same as Frenchmen; can 
become officers in regular 
army 
No promotion beyond 
noncommissioned rank; 
authority over African troops 
only 
Pension (25 years 
service) 
1,500 to 1,800 francs 437 to 572 francs 
 
 
In addition to being distinguished based on their colonial residence, soldiers 
were further divided based on their position; tirailleurs were either ancien 
combattants (combat veterans) or ancien militaires (career soldiers). Combat veterans 
                                                
58 Reprinted from Johnson, The Emergence of Black Politics, 190. 
 
26 
and career soldiers had varying access to general benefits for their service to the 
French Empire. All tirailleurs were supposed to receive a pension and have better 
access to employment, especially within the colonial administration. However, the 
lack of the état-civil (civil registry)⎯which would continue to be the source of 
problems with citizenship in 1946⎯limited the ability of France to fulfill its promises 
as it struggled to rebuild mainland France after the destruction of World War II. 
Many veterans did not receive their pensions and honors due to the bureaucracy’s 
failure to keep track of them, which was made especially difficult since tirailleurs 
frequently changed their name before or after service, as they were forced to adopt 
the surname of their chief before the war and changed it back after service.59 
However, France still attempted to pay the “blood tax” to former soldiers and 
eventually extended various citizenship rights to family members of tirailleurs. 
France continued to pay military pensions after African colonies gained independence, 
perpetuating the link between the colonizer and colonized.  
After fighting for the survival of the French republic, soldiers began to 
demand “reciprocity, entitlement, and state responsibility.”60 They often used their 
military uniforms as a way to outwardly illustrate their power and status within the 
community. This increase in privilege within the French empire may have motivated 
soldiers to become politically active in advocating for rights as citizens under 
colonialism and pushing for independence during the formation of the French Union. 
However, historian Gregory Mann claims that the evidence for soldiers fighting for 
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independence is “rarely substantiated,” and rather “political independence arose from 
the intersection of variety of factors most of which were beyond veterans’ control.” 61 
Veterans did engage in obtaining the privileges from serving in the French military, 
mostly material benefits through soldier pensions. This political activism often led to 
increased access to services and other rights, even though tirailleurs were often 
grouped with the sujets. Regardless of their role in the independence movements, 
tirailleurs represented a unique part of French-African society, which allotted them 
certain privileges and prestige because of their service to maintaining greater France.  
 
Originaires 
As briefly alluded above, originaires occupied a unique space within the 
French colonial system. Originaires belonged to the Four Communes of 
Senegal⎯Dakar, Saint Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée⎯and were granted French 
citizenship in 1848. At this same time, residents in the old colonies in the Caribbean 
and South America ended slavery and also gained citizenship in the French Empire, 
most of which are still overseas departments. Unlike later Africans granted French 
citizenship, who were required to renounce their personal status, originaires had “the 
rights of the citizen, including the rights to vote, while keeping their personal and 
family affairs under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts” and are sometimes referred to 
as citoyenneté dans le statut (citizenship status).62 Originaires possessed citizenship 
status nearly 100 years prior to the rest of the French Empire, which allotted them 
special privileges. This status as a citizen of France combined with the ability to 
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remain Muslim was even more extraordinary within the French Empire. Originaires 
could continue to practice polygamy and abide by their inheritance laws but also be 
politically active in the Four Communes. They were not under the jurisdiction of the 
discriminatory indigénat but rather the French judicial system. Originaires “were 
French politically and economically,” but they maintained their personal status.63 
Personal status would later prove an issue for the évolués of Algeria and the 
remaining African sujets when citizenship was extended to the entire French Empire 
in 1946.  
Originaires were unique in their ability to demand and gain political rights 
within the French Empire. Women living in the Four Communes also followed the 
activist model. African women did not have originaires status because women in 
France did not have the right to vote until 1945. Although women’s suffrage in 
France should have implied suffrage in the Four Communes, Senegalese women still 
had to protest against the Governor General for this specific status and gained 
citizenship privileges briefly after mainland France.64 Female originaires demanded 
to have a specific status within the French colonial empire because it solidified their 
access to political rights and belonging.  
The citizens of the Four Communes not only possessed unique rights 
compared to that of interior Senegal, but each city also had a distinct responsibility in 
the quotidian and long-term operations of the colony as well as those of greater 
French West Africa. For example, Saint-Louis was the colonial capital city until 1902 
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and contained the largest population of métis, Gorée served as the headquarters for 
colonial naval operations, Rufisque was the commercial center for the southern 
markets especially for peanuts due to its proximity to the inland areas growing crops, 
and Dakar was the administrative powerhouse, containing the Governor General’s 
palace and administration for all of French West Africa.65 Furthermore, in terms of 
geographic location, Saint-Louis was unique as it was a combination of both Islamic 
culture, influenced primarily by the nearby city of Médine, and the presence of 
French colonial administrators as well as métis traders.66 Because the Communes 
underwent urbanization in the late nineteenth century, they maintained an advantage 
over other African cities and are better adjusted to living communities composed of 
diverse peoples and backgrounds.67 
Because originaires possessed such a unique status, they demanded political 
representation from one of their own. Blaise Diagne won the deputy election to the 
French National Assembly in 1914 becoming the first African to hold such a 
prestigious position. Diagne was able to secure additional rights for both originaires 
and Africans. In 1916, he forced the French government to give permission to 
originaires access to jobs in mainland France.68 He also fought to extend citizenship 
to originaires’ descendants living outside of the Four Communes, adding more 
support for subsequent elections. Diagne had also contributed to the recruitment of 
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tirailleurs fighting for the French army, under the notions that they would be 
rewarded for their services with citizenship and social benefits.69 His significance for 
individual identity is that he believed that “the Senegalese were first of all Frenchmen 
and only secondarily black men.”70 
 
Évolués 
Differing from originaires status but still considered as a French citizen, was 
that of the évolué or the assimilé, who were originally Algerian Muslims that 
renounced their personal status in order to attain voting rights and trial under French 
courts. Although this form of citizenship was initially advocated as the most desirable 
and as a fulfillment of la mission civilisatrice, Algerians and other Africans who 
possessed such title were few and far between. Évolués were considered to be the 
educated African elite because they had frequently been educated in France and, 
additionally, could prove that they upheld the ideals of French republicanism. If 
granted such a distinct status, they were incorporated into French institutions in 
Africa. Such a status was not easily granted; during the period 1937-1943 only 73 
Africans achieved French citizenship (out of 276 who applied) through one of two 
mechanisms, plein droit (full rights) or voluntary admission. Plein droit was “an 
entitlement stemming from having won a Legion of Honor or other award or marriage 
to a French women in certain circumstances,” whereas voluntary admission required 
proving the qualities that the French administration deemed as assimilated to French 
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society.71 Évolués status was based on proving one’s identity as “French” and abiding 
by civil requirements consistently and throughout their life. Achieving this status was 
made increasing difficult as applicants had to prove that their entire family members 
were also “French,” meaning that they had registered their monogamous marriage and 
births of children with the état-civil and their children were receiving a French 
education as they happened.72 Because of the tedious legal requirements prior to 
requesting such status, many Africans were denied such a privileged status due to 
minor infractions. 
 
Métis 
The last distinct category among residents in French colonies was that of the 
métis, or a person of mixed parentage. 73 French colonial administrators, because of 
their need to be close to the African sujets in order to provide stability and enforce 
labor, were required to live in French West Africa for several yearlong periods. 
Oftentimes, these men would marry signares (elite African women). Because 
Frenchwomen were lacking in the colonies, France originally encouraged inter-racial 
marriages “to produce a more stable community.”74 However, these marriages were 
often not official in terms of Catholic rites and frequently dissolved when men 
returned to France. The signares, as well as their children, possessed certain 
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privileges in colonial French West Africa including inheritance of property and trade, 
which provided them with greater economic security and capacity.75 Offspring of a 
Frenchman and a native woman resulted in children of mixed parentage, referred to as 
métis in French. The status of métis was unique because they were considered to be 
French⎯unlike the principle of hypodescent of mulattos in the Americas⎯and were 
granted French political rights and social benefits at birth.  
Because of the presence of French blood, métis children were typically 
educated in the French system. These children, typically born out of wedlock, were a 
“symbolic threat” for the French Empire as they could demand certain rights based on 
their French ancestry but were not completely assimilated to the republican ideals of a 
French citizen and their appearance still resembled those of indigenous Africans.76 
Métis were granted full French citizenship, differing from the originaires and évolués 
citizenship status, meaning that social services of the French metropole were 
extended to these, often unclaimed, children. Métis did not inherit a unique identity 
but rather adopted their French citizenship as identity; they belonged to the “poor 
white” group or the elite natives of French colonies.77 They were considered more 
French in some instances compared to the other colonial statuses because of the 
French blood in their veins. However, despite the negative association of the métis as 
a representation of unfaithful Frenchmen, they were also viewed as an intermediary 
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between France and the colonies since they possessed qualities of “acclimatization, 
bilingualism, and the ability to command the natives.”78  
Métis had a unique place within the French colonial system, which provided 
more privileges and opportunities if they were able to prove their French heritage. 
This intermediary position and dual identity resulted in an elite status that allowed 
and encouraged métis to serve in positions of power, such as lower administrative 
positions and eventually mayors of the Communes and deputies representing Senegal 
to the French National Assembly.79 Although métis could be recognized as French jus 
soli, “colonial soil did not have the same power as metropolitan soil to confer 
nationality,” and they were still distinguished from colonial citizens and French 
nationals.80  
Based on the citizenship status one possessed in the French colony, one had 
varying access to education, political representation, and overall social services. 
Those who were seen as “more French” possessed better access and more equality 
with French citizens. The people who were “most French” include: “métis, 
originaires of the Quatre Communes, civil servants in State Services, former soldiers, 
Malians who had renounced their personal status and chosen to come under the 
French civil code."81 Civil servants were often prestigious Africans, such as chiefs, 
who advanced through the French administration to concede to policies of association 
and the fulfillment of assimilation. This discrimination based on personal status 
furthered the unequal access of the benefits of French society, such as education and 
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health care. Because this discrimination unequally favored the citizens of the Four 
Communes, Senegal illustrates how France has continued relations into the present 
with the Senegalese because a majority of its citizens are “most French” compared to 
other African nations.  
 
Identity at the Regional Level 
At the “state” level, France categorized colonial regions in unique ways, 
ranging from department to League of Nations mandate (UN trust territory) to 
protectorate to a full-fledged colony. Regional level identity is important, primarily 
because territorial borders are similar to state borders today, which encompasses the 
individuals residing within each region. Each category received resources according 
to their “Frenchness,” with Algeria receiving more than others as it contained the 
largest number of French/European settlers. Based on the regional status, France had 
varying levels of authority, as will be made clear in the discussion of protectorates. 
This level of authority is significant because it help French settlers to establish a rule 
of law and French culture within respective regions.  
 
Department  
Officially colonized in 1832, Algeria became a part of France and was 
considered a department (although overseas) of the Empire in the same way that Paris 
and Rhône are departments within the territorial borders of European France. The 
colons or pieds-noirs, who were of French descent but immigrated to Algeria or were 
born in the department to French parents, living in Algeria furthered the unique status 
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of the department because local Algerians had frequent interactions with French 
citizens. Colons had French citizenship, although some had never stepped foot on 
French soil in continental Europe. This was not considered odd because Algeria was 
an overseas department and therefore a part of France. There were just over 1 million 
colons living in Algeria at the time of independence, compared to nearly 12 million 
Algerians.  
On May 8, 1945, several Algerians erupted in protest in what became known 
as the Masscre de Sétif, where pieds-noirs (European settlers) were killed, and the 
French army retaliated by killing Muslim Algerians. The close integration and 
favoritism towards Algeria meant that President de Gaulle was unwilling to lose an 
integral part of France. Violence was manifested in war (1958-1962), which resulted 
in Algerians fighting and taking independence by force rather than declaration. This 
gruesome and bloody war has stained—especially due to the mass disappearances and 
torture of Algerians—French relations with Algeria since its resolve with the Evian 
accords in 1962.82 Despite the special colonial status, Algeria has not succumbed to 
French influence in the present.  
 
Protectorates  
Protectorates⎯Morocco and Tunisia⎯were autonomous under French rule as 
both countries were under the jurisdiction of legitimate authorities, the Sultan of 
Morocco and the Bey of Tunis. Tunisia was conquered in 1881, whereas Morocco 
maintained its de facto independence until 1912. In some instances, previous rulers 
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were allowed to maintain various levels of control and administration in exchange for 
taxes and labor to France.83 Because of the protectorates’ experience in limited self-
rule, France quickly granted independence for Morocco and Tunisia. The positive 
experience of decolonization in the protectorates has contributed to good relations 
with France today.  
 
Mandates 
Mandates from the League of Nations⎯Togo and Cameroon⎯were former 
German colonies that were allotted to France after the World War I. Because 
Germany was unfit to keep its colonies, and the international community did not 
believe that African nations should have independence, these two nations were given 
to France for administrative purposes and protection. Togo and Cameroon were not 
seen as colonies because the United Nations (League of Nations) oversaw many of 
French administrative and diplomatic actions in these two territories.84 However, “the 
day-to-day administration of mandates was in most respects assimilated to that of 
colonies, but France neither assumed sovereignty over its mandates nor conferred its 
nationality on their people.”85  Rule over mandates was similar to colonial rule as 
government officials and clerks were required to speak the French language. French 
remains the working language of Togo and the French parts of Cameroon. Although 
French control over mandates was limited and shorter than full-fledged colonial rule, 
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France still facilitated the spread of French “identity” by implementing colonial 
institutions, such as education, language, and access to government services.  
 
Colonies 
The last classification encompasses the majority of French possessions, and it 
is the status of colony. Colonies were subject to the strictest forms of direct rule and 
assimilation. Colonies were ruled by the Governor General and were separated into 
two distinct regions: French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF). 
The French West African territory included Benin (Dahomey), Burkina Faso (Upper 
Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali (French Soudan), Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. 
While the French Equatorial African territory included Central African Republic 
(Ubangui-Chari), Chad, Republic of Congo, and Gabon. Although Madagascar was 
also considered a colony, its geographic location separated it from the AOF and AEF 
colonies.  
French possessions, where French officials had complete jurisdiction, were 
divided up and ruled at four levels: (1) territories, (2) colonies, (3) circles, and (4) 
provinces, cantons, or villages depending on the region. A Governor General presided 
over each territory⎯one in Dakar, Senegal (AOF) and one in Brazzaville, Congo 
(AEF)⎯and administrative duties and tax collections were further organized into 
chefs de canton, which were sometimes the existing African chiefs. The lower levels 
of administrative and official positions were eventually held by Africans since French 
officials would outsource less appealing jobs, such as collecting taxes from residents, 
to local African chiefs in order to avoid the negative association. The French viewed 
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these canton chiefs as symbolic and were hesitant to give power. However, in 
Guinea-Conakry and Senegal, the French could not maintain control or remove the 
canton chiefs without revolt. To avoid losing their legitimate rule in these colonies, 
France excluded the most powerful and traditional rulers from holding administrative 
positions but allowed those with similar ideals to rise within the administration.86 
Under association, elite Africans gained more French education and could be 
identified as more French due to education in the French language and culture. They 
were able to hold elite positions within the French colonies and territories; one such 
position was that of the Deputy of the Four Communes of Senegal, which was first 
held by Blaise Diagne. With an understanding of how different regions were ruled by 
France, we next look at the contributions that each region played in the formation of 
the French Union.  
 
French Union and French Community 
 Although many scholars argue that independence was motivated by the ideas 
of self-determination from the Atlantic Charter and pushed further by the French-
African soldiers from the World Wars, a closer examination of history illustrates how 
political leaders in francophone Africa, especially Leopold Senghor and Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny, were instead advocating for equality and closeness with the rest 
of the French Empire rather than complete independence. 87  This advocacy for 
forming a union with France illustrates how states were aware of their levels of 
                                                
86 Conklin, A Mission to Civilize, 117. 
87 Richard Dowden, “Ivory Coast’s Descent into Madness,” The Guardian, January 1, 2011, accessed 
April 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/02/ivory-coast-richard-dowden-
comment. 
 
39 
“Frenchness” prior to independence. In 1946, due to the demands of the originaires 
and évolués, who were members of the Assemblée National (National Assembly), 
every person living under French rule would be given citizenship, through the Lamine 
Guèye law. However, in the Four Communes and the exclusive African elite, 
citizenship was not applied homogenously throughout the empire. Prior to this 
“universal” citizenship law, French Muslims achieved full citizenship rights under the 
Ordinance of March 7, 1944, which  
applied to former military officers, holders of certain diplomas, active or 
retired civil servants, current and former members of chambers of commerce 
or agriculture, certain councilors, holders of various civilian and military 
honors or medals, members of councils of indigenous cooperatives, and 
several categories of auxiliaries to the administration.88  
 
Those who were eligible for citizenship participated more than others in French 
institutions. The emphasis on civil status and social involvement, plus the distinction 
of the category French Muslims perpetuated the inequality within the French Empire, 
soon to be the French Union. Algerian Muslims maintained a unique position in the 
quantity who were able to achieve citizenship, whereas the rest of French Africa were 
still obligated to their duties as sujets rather than French citizens. 
Despite this move towards equality, actual implementation of citizenship 
proved more challenging and led to further distinction between statuses. This 
differentiation was rooted in the lack of an état-civil in the French territories⎯the 
alternate name for colonies post-World War II to illustrate a more inclusive French 
nation⎯and the absence of education among all citizens. Because France unevenly 
provided social services in the colonies, the état-civil was not present throughout the 
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French African territory. Some claim that this absence should not have limited civil 
participation, since the majority of the Frenchmen after the French Revolution “were 
illiterate… [and] technical difficulties were not invoked when it came to collecting 
taxes” from the colonies; however it limited citizenship.89 Because of this difference 
in implementing the état civil two hundred years later and the focus on the état-civil 
only for African residents, African elites and modern day scholars have argued that 
this excuse was rooted in racism. The politicians of the French Union argued that the 
lack of the état-civil prevented Africans from voting in a legal manner; however, this 
was mainly a policy to prevent the large African population⎯that outnumbered the 
number of French citizens in European France⎯from controlling the legislative 
branch of the government.  
Prior to breaking down the differential ways citizenship was applied in the 
French Union and French Community, it is imperative to understand how the regions 
of the former French Empire were distinguished from another, although certain areas 
remained more prestigious (and more “French) than others. The categories included:  
1. 'Exterior provinces': Algeria, Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana. 
They would be considered a 'prolongation of metropolitan territory' and be 
represented in Parliament as well as in a federal assembly, while retaining a 
'large administrative liberty.' 
 
2. 'Federal pays': Indochina, New Caledonia, Madagascar. These units, each 
with multiple components, were considered to have more 'maturity' than other 
overseas territories and would be allowed to develop a 'political personality' 
and elect deputies to a federal assembly. 
 
3. 'Federal territories': AOF, AEF, Togo, Cameroon, Oceania, French 
Somalia. These territories would remain 'under supervision' ['sous tutuelle'], 
but as they matured, they would acquire more political 'personality' and 
eventually choose their representatives to the federal assembly. 
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4. 'International protectorates': Tunisia, Morocco, New Hebrides. Under 
international law, they possessed sovereignty and nationality, but the 
commission saw a 'spontaneous movement' among them toward 'the French 
community.' They too would have a place in the federal assembly.90 
 
Depending on the categorization, each territory/province/protectorate/pays would 
have specific representation in the National Assembly. The overseas territories had 64 
out of 586 seats in the ANC, which were broken down by region and the number of 
European French and African French living in the area. For example, AOF had six 
deputies for Africans and four for French citizens. Morocco and Tunisia’s indigenous 
populations were not represented at the legislative level; only the European 
population could choose the five deputies for membership in the National 
Assembly. 91  Additionally, French and African legislators debated the idea of 
bicameral legislature and a double college of electorates. Senghor and Houphouët-
Boigny, two African representatives in the National Assembly, argued that this would 
be an excluding and racist policy, whereas French politicians feared the sheer number 
of Africans influencing too much of the new French Republic.  
 In addition to the discussion of how to include African regions in the French 
Union, debates shifted to citizenship and if it would include both civil and political 
rights accompanied by French nationality. Those living in the Associated States, like 
Morocco and Tunisia, had only civil rights because these states had a different form 
of autonomy and self-rule than the rest of the French Union.92 France did not have a 
legitimate, enforcing power in the Associated States and could merely suggest or 
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propose that Morocco and Tunisia adopt the rights provided by the French 
Constitution. However, citizens of Morocco and Tunisia were “not foreigners on 
French soil,” but rather had a unique option to exercise their rights as a citizen of the 
French Union.93 
Residents could possess multiple nationalities. For example, one living in 
Soudan Français could be both Sudanese and French. These discrepancies of French 
Union citizenships “came out of a fundamentally imperial notion of governing people 
differently, with an evolutionary language betraying the notion of hierarchy rather 
than mutual acceptance”⎯meaning that the French Union attempted to portray an 
egalitarian society but in reality continued its practice of imperialism.94 The French 
Assembly clarified the inequality between French citizenship and French Union 
citizenship; those in European France (or having ancestors from European France) 
would have French citizenship but those from the colonies would possess citizenship 
of the Union, where their passports would say “ ‘citoyen de l’Union’ (citizen of the 
French Union) as a badge of inferiority.”95 This ambiguity in the “quality of citizen” 
allowed for continued discrimination.96 The French Union was multinational with an 
imposed French nationality.  
 With the Lamine Guèye law⎯the law that gave citizenship to the territories⎯ 
residents in African territories had citizenship but did not necessarily possess the right 
to vote directly for representation in the common assembly: “there was universal 
suffrage, but not necessarily direct. There would be legislative assemblies in each 
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territory, but they would have ‘delegated legislative power.’ ”97 This discrimination is 
twofold: (1) because the état-civil was not fully in place, France lacked the 
bureaucratic capabilities to register every citizen, and (2) France was fearful that the 
sheer number of Africans voting would change the basis of the republican principles 
currently upheld by the Constitution. The French Union was trying to advocate for 
equality by removing racist institutions, and “no more could the status of the 
‘indigène’—or a religious or racial designation—figure in decrees or laws, nor could 
personal status be an obstacle to the exercise of any right, with the notable exception 
of the right to vote.” 98  Few citizens had the right to vote directly for their 
representatives. This discrimination of citizenship in French Union is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1., 99 which demonstrates the difference between French and personal civil 
status, as well as voters and nonvoters in the overseas regions.  
 
 
Table 1.2.. Citizenship in the French Union 
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In 1956, France compromised and granted some authority to African colonial 
possessions through the loi cadre (reform act). The loi cadre transferred some 
authoritative powers from French to African politicians. However, this compromise 
on equality was not enough to convince many Africans to stay in the French Union. 
Because of the existing tensions, the French Assembly proposed a vote from each 
colonial possession to join the French Community. Guinea-Conakry was the only 
colony to vote “non” and was subsequently the first French territory to leave the 
French Empire. The African territories that voted “oui” now sought to discern their 
place in the greater French Community.  
The elites of the territories attempted to establish their significance within the 
French Union. Leopold Senghor and Modibo Keita⎯the future presidents of Senegal 
and Mali⎯organized their territories into the Mali Federation. Senghor, especially, 
advocated for the French Union to be organized into a confederation with federations 
between African nations.100 Senghor attempted to persuade Houphouët-Boigny and 
the rest of French West Africa to join the federation, but Côte d’Ivoire refused 
because she wanted territorial autonomy and direct communication with France rather 
than a federation.101 Confusingly, Côte d’Ivoire joined with Niger, Upper Volta 
(Burkina Faso), and Dahomey (Benin) to create a coordinating body called the 
Conseil de l’Entente (Council of Entente).102 This division between African elites and 
leaders resulted in “French West Africa split into two blocks” held together by their 
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relationship with France rather than each other, meaning they lacked horizontal 
solidarity.103 
 As these African federations failed, based on differences between independent 
states and the lack of cooperation, the former French-African states shifted their focus 
towards independence from France through means of gaining “competences” in order 
to avoid the complete break between colonizer and colonized that happened in 
Guinea-Conakry in 1958. Not only was there a desire from Africa to gain 
independence at this point, but also President Charles de Gaulle began to realize that 
the former colonies were costing more than they were worth. However, France was so 
“eager to keep the [Mali Federation] in the French fold that it changed its own 
constitution to allow an independent, sovereign state to remain in the Community.”104 
When Guinea demanded independence, French administrators abandoned the colony 
by “empt[ying] their cash registers and shipp[ing] the weapons of the police, the 
library of the Ministry of Justice, and the furniture of the governor’s palace back to 
France.”105 Not only had France become desperate to preserve the former empire, but 
it disproportionately favored colonies that were more like France. 
As former colonies gained independence, de Gaulle left “the door open to its 
ex-citizens to reassert their French nationality if they established residence within the 
current boundaries of France, even if they had another nationality.”106 The French 
government provided freedom of movement in the former French Community until 
the 1970s. The formerly colonized were able to travel throughout francophone Africa 
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and France for both labor and leisure. Once again, there was discrimination based on 
geography and recognizing French nationality post-independence: 
Africans born before independence could have their French nationality 
‘recognized’ if and only if they established residency within the current 
boundaries of the French Republic… people who were descended from an 
‘originaire’…of the République française could retain their French nationality 
without the residency requirements…Algerians could retain French 
nationality without settling in France if they were of French civil status.107 
 
Only those who had an adequate amount of ‘Frenchness’ were able to apply for 
French citizenship and nationality with the dissolution of the French Community, yet 
originaires did not have to be physically present in mainland France to preserve their 
French nationality.  
 
Conclusion 
France lacked a unified doctrine for West and Equatorial Africa; instead of 
homogeneous policies, “actions had been undertaken piecemeal, often with the best 
of intentions.”108 Because of this piecemeal process of applying French rule on the 
African continent, the colonized often differed in their perceptions of identity and the 
legitimacy of French rule. Those with a “political belonging,” in the French Republic, 
especially those who held political positions, fared better during and after 
colonization than those who remained sujets throughout the entire period.109 By 
actively participating in the colonial empire, through voting and serving in minor 
administrative positions, some Africans began to adopt the French identity, as was the 
case for the group of assimilés. As will be analyzed in the following chapter, these 
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groups often facilitated and accepted a close relationship with their former colonizer 
in the post-independent years, furthering the relative “Frenchness.” These levels of 
“Frenchness” created during colonialism at both the individual and regional levels 
have repercussions for modern-day relations, as will be illustrated in the third chapter 
and the presentation of how identity drives aid allocation.   
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Chapter 2: The Role of Françafrique in Post-Colonial Identity 
Formation 
 
The failures of the French Union and Community influenced the new, 
neocolonial approach through covert networks, or what has been called Françafrique. 
French colonialism was the beginning of “Frenchness” in Africa, but de Gaulle made 
several attempts to maintain influence in former colonies, including the failed French 
Union followed by Françafrique interventions. Despite the collapse of the French 
Union in 1960, caused by the independence movements that encompassed much of 
Africa, France has continued to maintain its hold on former African territories 
through the policy of Françafrique. This unofficial policy arose under the de Gaulle 
administration with the appointment of Jacques Foccart as chief advisor of cellule 
africaine (African cell). Following the decolonization of French colonial possessions 
(excluding Guinea and Algeria) in 1960, de Gaulle advocated for “independence for 
France’s African colonies only in theory, while keeping them reliant on France in 
practice.”110 Françafrique was implemented through bilateral treaties of cooperation 
with eighteen former French colonies. These bilateral treaties included the creation of 
the CFA franc zone, holding of African reserves in the French Treasury, budgets 
directly dependent on French aid, French officials running African schools, and a 
handful of defense agreements. The origins of Françafrique are rooted in these 
bilateral agreements in the immediate post-colonial world. 
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So what does Françafrique really mean? Françafrique is a term that broadly 
denotes the relationship between France and former French colonies.111 However, in 
recent years, it has been extended to include other African countries as well. The term 
itself is borrowed from the former Côte d’Ivoire President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, 
who maintained a close relationship with various French administrations throughout 
his thirty-three yearlong rule. More specifically, Françafrique includes informal 
networks—such as the corrupt relationship between French corporation executives 
and African political leaders—as well as the official channels of French education 
and military assistance. The informal networks of Françafrique are not officially 
sponsored by the state but operate alongside the policies of the French government.  
Further emphasizing the uniqueness of the relationship between France and 
former colonies through Françafrique is the absence of such in imperial counterparts, 
like the British or Portuguese. Although many former British colonies belong to the 
Commonwealth of Nations, this intergovernmental organization is based on 
consensus. French actors—specifically politicians and wealthy businessmen—mostly 
determine Françafrique with little consultation from their African correspondents. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I will use Françafrique as the combination of official and 
informal policies between the French government, French multinational corporations, 
and French actors, in their negotiations and often exploitation of African nations. 
Despite originating at the end of colonization, Françafrique has continued to drive 
French policies towards its former colonies and other African nations.  
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Françafrique illustrates the interconnectedness between states, with France 
grabbing for power in African nations through social, political, and economic means. 
Françafrique and French interest in Africa is motivated by the desire for French 
influence and access to natural resources. The material benefits from petrodollars and 
secret economic negotiations cannot be completely disregarded as a part of the 
motivation behind Françafrique.112 Some critics of Franco-African relations have 
dubbed Françafrique as “France à fric,” which translates as a source of cash.113 
Although there are material gains to be made from the policies of Françafrique, 
France enacts such policies based on identity and history. This analysis will become 
clearer in Chapter 3 when I control for economic benefits as a factor in determining 
aid allocation.  
In this chapter, I argue that Françafrique is the mechanism through which 
France continues to influence the relative level of “Frenchness.” Although the initial 
identity was formed during the colonial period, continued interaction between French 
and African actors through neocolonialist policies increases the shared identity 
present in each former French colonial possession. The first section will reference the 
identity theory necessary for understanding how Françafrique can influence the 
identity of a particular state. The following section will illustrate how Françafrique is 
extensive, as the relationship affects many different aspects of African politics, 
economics, and culture. Françafrique often increases the “Frenchness” a certain state 
has because African actors play a more important role than in the colonial period. 
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Analyzing how Françafrique contributes to identity formation is vital for 
understanding how identity determines aid allocation.  
 
Françafrique and Identity 
Following the embarrassment of the Vichy government during World War II, 
historians have observed, “that the building of French great power status was a 
constant preoccupation of French policy makers,” especially as the Atlantic Charter 
dismissed the claims for colonial possessions, as was discussed in Chapter 1.114 In 
order to uphold this sphere of influence,115 French exceptionalism, and the ideals of 
liberté, égalité, et fratenité (liberty, equality, and fraternity) enshrined in the French 
constitution, de Gaulle proposed the formation of a French Community that would 
incorporate French West and Equatorial Africa with more autonomy within the 
French Empire. When the Fourth Republic quickly crumbled with the independence 
movements of 1960, France attempted to maintain its perceived status as a world 
power by advocating for a “familial” relationship with former colonies.116 African 
independence did not erase the ties of colonialism; rather these ties were reshaped 
into networks (reseaux) and families. This categorization as ‘family’ rather than a 
relationship based on material capabilities, led to the special treatment that is 
Françafrique. Françafrique, itself, has been categorized as a web of “highly 
personalized, family-like relations between the French and African political leaders 
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and the parallel networks of economic and political elites.”117 This familial identity 
“explains why Europeans sustain special economic, political, institutional 
relationships with otherwise ordinary (even unappealing) partners.”118 The notion of 
family creates a collective identity that results in special treatment for those who 
share such identity.  
States identities can be hierarchical, meaning that they value or prioritize 
identities over one another. For example, Senegal can identify as a member of the 
African Union and a democracy in West Africa, in addition to its partnership with the 
French. Because identities can change, albeit slowly, Françafrique insured that the 
French identity established during colonization would not deteriorate. The repeated 
interactions between French and African actors—heads of state, government officials, 
corporations, citizens, etc.—lead to a collective French identity.  
 
The Channels of Françafrique 
Françafrique has historically been and continues to be the de facto policy of 
French governments following decolonization. Following the collapse of the French 
Union, de Gaulle wanted to maintain France’s power status by prioritizing its existing 
sphere of influence, in former African colonies and other French-speaking nations 
(Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire). Because France 
primarily saw itself as a “world power,” despite the contrary views held by most other 
states, and the policies of Françafrique and continuous intervention in Africa were an 
attempt to uphold such status.  
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Françafrique is a form of neocolonialism because it is, by definition, the 
French attempt to influence African politics, culture, and economics. Neocolonialism, 
in this instance, differs from colonialism in the extent to which African actors possess 
agency. During colonization, African agency was present but more constrained due to 
the structure of direct rule in French territories. In the post-colonial period, African 
heads of state possess sovereignty and jurisdiction in their respective countries, and 
oftentimes they practice such authority in order to keep French influence at bay. 
However, some African heads of state choose to use French influence to their 
advantage and seek closer economic and political ties in order to promote economic 
growth and clout in the international community. Both French and African actors are 
aware of their agency and role. This shared understanding illustrates the influence of 
African leaders in the continuity of Françafrique. 
A primary example of the difference in African agency is Guinea. Guinea-
Conakry was the first French African colony to gain independence. When de Gaulle 
allowed colonies to vote on joining the French Union, Guinea simply said “non,” and 
as a result ended their favored relationship with France. African heads of state who 
disagreed with “French interests were simply frozen out, as in the case of Guinea’s 
President, Sekou Touré, who sought and gained independence in 1958, before Paris 
was ready to relinquish control.” 119  Rather than encouraging autonomy of an 
independent state, de Gaulle evacuated all French officials and all things associated 
with French assistance, even doorknobs from government buildings, from Guinea-
Conakry. Unlike other French interventions in its former colonies, France has 
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primarily left Guinea-Conakry to its own devices, especially as Guinea followed a 
Marxist regime throughout the Cold War.120 In the present, France is not privy to 
secret deals for Guinea’s mineral reserves, but instead competes among other nations 
in the market place for potential investment opportunities.121 France is treated like 
most other foreign nations in regards to economic and political relations.  
Another example of exercising agency is Rwanda, which was a former 
Belgian colony that possessed relative levels of “Frenchness.” Rwanda belonged to 
the French-speaking community, and France attempted to further this relationship 
through both aid and technical advice. France was deeply involved in Rwanda 
through language training and support of the government. However, Rwanda 
abandoned French as their official language in 2009, in an attempt to tarnish France’s 
reputation for their suspected role in the 1994 genocide. Rwanda then joined the 
British Commonwealth, dealing another blow to French influence.  
 
Variations in Françafrique 
Before providing analysis on the mechanisms of Françafrique in contributing 
to French African identity, it is essential to understand that the policies have not been 
homogenous since 1960. Despite its lengthy status as de facto—and sometimes de 
jure—French policy in Africa has wavered with each president; however, all 
presidents have attempted to preserve exception française (French exceptionalism), 
both domestically and internationally. Although much of the French leadership has 
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followed in the footsteps of the Fifth Republic’s first president (Charles de Gaulle), 
the policies have ranged from mutually beneficial to predominantly exploitative.  
Different presidents, such as Pompidou (1969-1974) and Mitterand (1981-
1995) approached the role of France from a perspective of cultural influence by 
emphasizing la Francophonie and hosting a large number of Franco-African summits. 
Others, like d’Estaing (1974-1981) and Sarkozy (2007-2012), sustained the military 
reach of Françafrique by increasing the number of military agreements, bases, 
soldiers, and interventions.122 The current president, François Hollande, promised to 
“bring a moral dimension to French foreign policy” towards Africa.123 Despite their 
continuous attempts for a more honest and equal relationship, the reach of 
Françafrique continued to dominate and exploit much of Africa.  
 
Mechanisms 
 The strength of the relationship between an African nation and France are 
based on the presence of the following categories: (1) the number of French citizens, 
(2) education, (3) language, (4) government institutions, (5) technical assistance, (6) 
military presence, (7) shared currencies, (8) multinational corporations, (9) economic 
relationships, and (10) similarities in voting patterns in the United Nations. These 
mechanisms of Françafrique influence different aspects of identity and lead to a 
greater level of “Frenchness” by permeating nearly all facets of the Franco-African 
relationship.  
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 The following section will provide detail of the various mechanisms of 
Françafrique that strengthen the shared identity between France and former colonies. 
However, this list is not comprehensive, as other aspects—such as the number of 
Africans educated in France—construct an identity with French-like characteristics. 
These additional mechanisms are equally important but either exist at a small level or 
lack the data to evaluate the effects. Examples will be presented throughout this 
chapter to illustrate the pervasiveness of Françafrique. These mechanisms illustrate 
how frequent interactions, a key determinant in the constructivist literature, facilitate 
identity formation. 
 
French Residents 
French citizens often migrate to former French colonies, for both economic 
and personal reasons. Figure 2.1. and Figure 2.2. illustrate the total French migrant 
stock residing in former colonies, split between West and Equatorial Africa, for the 
last 25 years.124 French migrants are not present in all former colonies and are 
predominantly concentrated in Benin, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Togo in West Africa 
and Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon. 
However, the number of French residents has varied based on the political climate in 
both France and various African nations. There was a significant presence of French 
nationals living in Senegal in 1960, due to its capital being the headquarters of French 
West Africa, and nearly 14,000 French migrants lived in Senegal in 2015. There were 
more French residents living in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1990s than during the colonial 
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Figure 2.1. Total French migrant stock in French West Africa  
 
Figure 2.2. Total French migrant stock in French Equatorial Africa  
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period, and “at the shoulder of every minister was a French ‘adviser.’ ”125 However, 
after the Ivoirian miracle subsided and conflict broke out in Côte d’Ivoire, most 
French migrants returned to France. Although at a personal level, the presence of 
French citizens residing in Africa increases shared understanding that facilitates a 
common identity. 
 
Education 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, education was one of the primary tools used during 
colonization through the policies of assimilation and mise en valeur. Unlike the 
colonial institutions, however, education in sub-Saharan Africa today is not 
distinguished between rural and urban schools, and variation does not exist in the 
same facet as the colonial period, where there were clear divides between education 
for individuals and states of a particular status. For example, originaires had access to 
French education, whereas sujets attended school with the specific intention of 
generating a healthy workforce or did not attend school at all. The African education 
system still resembles the French colonial education style, despite the high poverty 
levels and poor governance of many West African countries. This is partially due to 
France continuing to intervene in education, especially in regards to the French 
language. In 2014, France proposed an ambitious plan to train 100,000 African 
teachers in the French language, meaning that the French government is using 
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education as a neocolonial tool to invest in the education of other nations’ youth.126 
This emphasis on the French language is evident in the following section. 
 
Language 
 Language, because of its ability to disseminate cultural understanding, was 
one of the most effective colonial tools under the policies of assimilation and la 
mission civilisatrice. French was the working language of government officials and 
various African elites, and it is still used in many former French colonies. French is 
the official language of fourteen countries, including two former Belgian colonies. 
Additionally, in ten former French colonies, 25 percent of the population speaks 
French.127 Language is one of the primary ways to facilitate cultural understanding, 
and therefore the French language increases “Frenchness.”  
The Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (International 
Organization of la Francophonie, OIF) is an official institution created in 1970 and 
comprised of nation-states where either: (1) French is the official language, (2) a 
portion of the population speaks French, or (3) they possess an affiliation with the 
French culture. Under this broad definition, there are fifty-seven member states, 
including several in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia; however, the majority of 
members are former French colonies in Africa. According to the official website, the 
OIF “organises [sic] political activities and actions of multilateral cooperation that 
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benefit French-speaking populations.”128 This organization illustrates how France has 
institutionalized the use of language as soft power to increase the spread of economic 
and political ties with other nations. OIF member states constitute a significant 
portion of the global population. There are 274 million French speakers in the world, 
with 96.2 million currently residing in Africa.129 In addition to the former French 
colonies as members of la Francophonie, other nations have joined the organization 
in order to cooperate with regional partners in West and Equatorial Africa. One such 
member of la Francophonie is Equatorial Guinea, who, although a former Spanish 
colony, has adopted French as a language in order to foster better relations with their 
West African neighbors and France.130  
 
Government Institutions 
 The OIF only touches the surface of Franco-African institutions, which 
attempt to promote exception française abroad. Prior to decolonization, Fonds 
d’Investissement Economique et Social (Investment Fund for Economic and Social 
Development or FIDES), was implemented as a means to develop colonial areas 
overseas. Although not the first French program in the colonial empire, FIDES was 
significant in French attempts to build and sustain influence in Africa. In the years 
following independence, many government organizations, with similar capacity and 
purpose, have been created and modified under various French presidents. In 1959, 
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President de Gaulle replaced FIDES and created a new fund called the Fonds d’Aide 
et de Coopération (Fund for Aid and Cooperation, FAC), whose mission now 
included technical and military defense in addition to cultural and economic 
assistance.131 Additional institutions were formed under FAC to provide development 
loans and supervise various projects. The Ministry for Cooperation and Development 
(MC) was formed to fulfill the official French aid policy outlined in the Jeanneney 
Report in 1964.132 De Gaulle continued to create multiple institutions to pursue his 
Franco-African policy including separate cultural (Missions de Coopération et 
d’Action Culturelle) and military (Mission Militaire de Coopération) organizations 
throughout his presidency. 133  Perhaps most significant was his appointment of 
Jacques Foccart as Monsieur Afrique (Mr. Africa) as the head of the African cell, 
which was an advisory committee that created French policies for Africa. Foccart 
would greatly shape the Françafrique regime in years to come and advise multiple 
presidents.  
The second president of the Fifth Republic, Georges Pompidou, 
institutionalized the French language as OIF, in order to promote the cooperation 
among French speakers. Additionally, he hosted the inaugural Franco-African summit 
in December 1973, which has had profound effects on the relationships between the 
former colonizer and African nation-states even today.134 Similar to the OIF in 
extending culture but increasing the scope of such influence is the Institut Français—
responsible for spreading French culture abroad—located in both Dakar and Saint 
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Louis, which were two of the Four Communes.135  Because of the historical status of 
these two cities, they engage in more cultural formation than other cities in the former 
French colonial empire.  
Subsequent presidents enacted minor changes in French institutions operating 
in Africa. One of the most significant alterations occurred when President François 
Holland (2012-2017) combined the cabinet positions for development and 
Francophonie in order to reduce the number of ministers and secretary-generals. This 
combination has faced criticism from international nongovernmental organizations, 
which argue that it confuses the separation between members of la Francophonie and 
the rest of the development community.136 The international community did not 
support combining development with the furthering of French strategic influence into 
one position as this obscures the line between French and non-French policy. The 
alphabet soup of organizations pertaining to French-speaking Africa is not exhausted 
in this brief overview; however, it provides relevant information for understanding 
the pervasive aspects of Françafrique from a top-down perspective. 
 
Technical Assistance 
 Because France had worked so diligently to establish the French Union just to 
see its demise two years later, they were unwilling to permanently abandon their 
former colonies without providing advice and assistance. This unwillingness was a 
trend among colonial powers, like Britain and Portugal, who felt that African nations 
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were not yet ready for full independence and needed continued administrative and 
technical support for an unforeseen period. However, British and Portuguese 
administers did not intervene to the same extent as the French. Following 
independence, “the immediate entourage of most Francophone leaders included many 
Frenchmen in key positions—chief of cabinet, private secretary, bodyguards” who 
served as advisors to newly democratically elected leaders in African nation-states.137 
Oftentimes, former French secret servicemen served as part of the African 
presidential guard.  For example, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire 
appointed several French citizens to government positions and other advisory roles. 
He maintained his strong relationship with France throughout his presidency. From 
1970-1990, France provided $8.2 billion (1990 prices) 138 in technical assistance 
expenditures by “revamping the justice and security sectors.”139 
 Furthermore, France has frequently held Franco-African summits to sustain 
channels of political and economic advice, fostering increased relationships between 
African states and France. These summits are vital to the notion of the French pré 
carré and in the recent past have included non-French speaking countries, like 
Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, who has a poor reputation in the international community.140 
The extension of an invitation to a non-francophone, former British colony illustrates 
France’s potential intentions to invest in Zimbabwe’s economy, which lacks the 
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French historical relationship but may provide friendly relations and access to natural 
resources.  
 
Heads of State 
Françafrique, through various French presidents and ministers, resulted in the 
formation of a French identity at the highest level of government. France attempted to 
control former colonies by helping to elect politicians that were allied with France.141 
Corporations provided campaign funds and French officials offered support during 
elections. However, empowered African heads of state often challenged France on 
French influence in domestic affairs. Countries with a relatively higher level of 
“Frenchness” often have leaders who are aligned with French policy, notably Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Gabon. When leaders were aligned with French interests, they 
often remained in power for several decades, despite the high number of coups d’état 
in Africa. By serving for long-term periods, African heads of state further solidified 
the French-African relationship.  
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
The first president of Côte d’Ivoire, Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993), set 
the precedent for the country’s relationship with France. Houphouët-Boigny was 
involved in the formation of the French Union, as well as setting the criteria for the 
policy of Françafrique. Houphouët-Boigny used French assistance in order to seize 
power over the country, as well as the military, following independence on August 7, 
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1960. Furthermore, Houphouët-Boigny modeled the political structure of Côte 
d’Ivoire after the system during colonization. For example, he maintained the same 
sous-sections (regions) and used something similar to direct rule.142 Houphouët-
Boigny held the presidency for thirty-four years and throughout his life, he upheld the 
advantageous relationship with the French. Under his rule, he allowed for 
neighboring country residents, such as those of Burkina Faso and Togo, to immigrate 
to Côte d’Ivoire; many of these immigrants obtained citizenship, which would yield 
consequences in future elections. 
Côte d’Ivoire has recently had a tumultuous relationship with France, 
consequentially under the authority of Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo achieved power as 
Alassane Ouattara was prohibited from running since his parents originated from 
Burkina Faso.143 In 2002, France intervened to protect French nationals during an 
attempted coup d’état and later received support from the UNSC for Operation 
Licorne.144 France was against Gbagbo as he was “perceived to be a danger to French 
private interests in strategic Ivorian companies, and Gbagbo’s policies “may have 
resulted in the end of secret deals for French firms.145 In October 2010, France 
assisted Côte d’Ivoire when Gbagbo refused to transfer power to Ouattara. France 
also helped to open an investigation of Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal 
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Court—he denied all charges against him in January 2016.146 French ministers 
supported Ouattara because of his relationship with Houphouët-Boigny and therefore 
had Ivoirian interests that aligned with French objectives. Since Ouattara obtained the 
presidency, French relations with the country have once again stabilized.  
 
Senegal  
President Léopold Senghor was a frontrunner in the formation of the French 
Union. Senghor viewed himself as a Frenchman, as he had studied at the University 
of Paris and was well known for composing French poetry.147 Senghor had advocated 
for a federation of French-African states and was politically active in maintaining 
Senegal’s relationship with France following independence. Under Senghor’s policies, 
Senegal aligned with French objectives in order to economically gain, in terms of 
trade and exchange of culture. For example, there are over 7,500 Senegalese students 
attending higher education in France. These students will likely become the next 
Senegalese leaders, and they have an understanding of the shared Franco-African 
relationship.  
Senghor held the presidency for twenty years before peacefully transitioning 
power to Abdou Diouf. Unlike Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal has had fewer scandals and 
maintains a larger network through French corporations and cultural institutions. 
Subsequent Senegalese presidents have followed the Senghor’s approach for 
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maintaining a healthy and beneficial relationship with France. By attending various 
French-African summits and building Françafrique networks, Senegalese heads of 
state have furthered the presence of “Frenchness” among government officials and 
the domestic population.   
 
Gabon  
Omar Bongo served as president of Gabon for 42 years (1967-2009), and his 
son, Ali Bongo, took office shortly after his death. France was especially interested in 
forming a close relationship with Bongo because of his country’s oil reserves, as well 
as Gabon’s existing influence in neighboring countries due to its historical role as the 
capital of French Equatorial Africa. Not surprisingly, one of the largest companies in 
Gabon is Total, formerly known as Elf Aquitaine. The personal relationship between 
President Omar Bongo and France resulted in secret deals for French oil companies 
and the advice of hundreds of French civil servants in Gabonese ministries. Because 
of this resource wealth, Bongo was able to exploit his “bank reserves to cultivate ties 
in Paris."148 Bongo was so powerful that he had influence over French elections and 
helped put certain politicians in office.149 Although unsubstantiated, there are rumors 
that Bongo specifically funded the campaigns for future French presidents Jacques 
Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.150 This unique relationship between Bongo and six 
French presidents illustrates the role of African leaders in furthering the French 
influence.  
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Military Interventions 
 Likely the most controversial aspect of French presence in Africa, France 
currently maintains four permanent military bases in former African colonies—
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Djibouti. France is the only former colonizer to 
keep troops in its former African dependencies, 151 as illustrated in Figure 2.3. 152 In 
1960, France encouraged newly independent nations to sign bilateral defense treaties  
  
Figure 2.3. Military bases and operations in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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that have since contributed to modern Franco-African relations and a level of 
“Frenchness” based on continued interaction and military protection. France 
maintains military bases in other countries—besides the four on the African 
continent—but the bases in Senegal, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Djibouti are unique 
because they are forces de presence (military presence) rather than forces de 
souveraineté (sovereign military). The difference is that forces de presence defend 
des intérêt français (French interests) rather than protect French territories, like 
French Guyana and Antilles.153 
Since independence, France has intervened nineteen times between 1962 and 
1995 in both internal and external conflicts in former French possessions, in an 
attempt to prop up African leaders aligned with French interests and combat Islamic 
extremism.154 Post-independence bilateral defense treaties often gave France the right 
to intervene to preserve presidencies but also gave French corporations access to 
natural resources. Abiding by the notion of helping friends first, France intervened in 
Côte d’Ivoire following the election of Alassane Ouattara when Laurent Gbagbo 
refused to leave office under Operation Licorne. Ouattara had served as prime 
minister under the favorable Houphouët-Boigny and had already advocated for a 
close relationship with France, but Gbagbo did not favor French interference or 
influence in Ivoirian domestic issues. French military presence has helped less 
democratic regimes to remain in power, amid domestic and international criticism. 
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President Sarkozy renegotiated defense treaties with former colonies during 
his presidency to create mutual obligations and remove secret clauses, which 
permitted France to unnecessarily intervene in African domestic affairs and civil 
wars.155 By offering protection to both African leaders and residents, France has 
strengthened their presence in the region and furthers the “Frenchness” of their 
supporters.  
 
CFA Franc Zone 
 The currency union of former French colonies may be the clearest example of 
Françafrique. Fourteen African nations—including non-former colonies, like Guinea-
Bissau and Equatorial Guinea—use the CFA franc currency in two zones, the West 
African and Central African franc. The CFA has often been skewed as a voluntary 
membership with tangible economic benefits, but France attempted to force countries 
to participate in the currency union. For example, the French secret service printed 
fake Guinean francs to destroy the local economy in their attempt to destabilize 
Guinea.156 However, in recent years, some non-French colonies have joined, which 
reduces the impact of the historical scandal. Table 2.1.157 provides a comprehensive 
list of present and past members of either CFA franc zone. French bankers dictate 
African monetary policy for states that adopt the CFA franc, and the French treasury 
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holds reserves of nearly $20 billion to guarantee the CFA franc.158 The West African 
central bank is located in Dakar, influencing the collective identity between France 
Table 2.1. Members of a CFA franc zone 
Country CFA zone Years 
Benin XOF 1960-present 
Burkina Faso XOF 1960-present 
Cameroon XAF 1960-present 
Central African Republic XAF 1960-present 
Chad XAF 1960-present 
Congo, Republic of XAF 1960-present 
Côte d’Ivoire XOF 1960-present 
Equatorial Guinea* XAF 1985-present 
Gabon XAF 1960-present 
Guinea XOF 1960 
Guinea-Bissau* XOF 1997-present 
Madagascar XAF 1960-1973 
Mali XOF 1960-1962; 1984-present 
Mauritania XOF 1960-1973 
Niger XOF 1960-present 
Senegal XOF 1960-present 
Togo XOF 1960-present 
XOF: CFA franc zone in West Africa 
XAF: CFA franc zone in Central Africa 
*Not a former French colony 
 
and Senegal. However, the African finance ministers and treasury departments are 
unable to adjust their monetary policy to combat various issues, like inflation or 
unemployment. This currency arrangement benefits France more than the African 
states, as the CFA franc does not favor African exports but rather promotes French 
exports to Africa.159 France devalued the CFA franc by half in 1994 when “France 
                                                
158 Robert Neuwirth, “African Monetary Union Stirs Criticism of France,” Bloomberg, April 17, 2014, 
accessed October 28, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-17/african-monetary-
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72 
bowed to Western pressure to end what amounted to a subsidy.”160 Prior to this 
devaluation, the CFA franc benefited the West African nations who used it as the 
official currency, but this devaluation has reduced the purchasing power of the former 
colonies, which are some of the poorest nations in the world (not including oil-rich 
Gabon). Following the adoption of the euro in 1999, France pegged the CFA franc as 
1 EUR = 655.957 XOF. 
 
Multinational Corporations 
 Under the guise of Françafrique, French companies were granted significant 
privileges in Africa, with additional favoritism towards French national companies, 
such as Elf Aquitaine. Many of these firms and organizations were established during 
colonization and remained in former colonies as a form of neocolonialism. For 
example, Gabon has nearly 120 French companies, including Elf, within its borders 
despite being a small nation of 1.6 million.161 These multinational corporations are 
often accompanied by French businessmen, who increase the interpersonal interaction 
between French and African actors and therefore a common identity. 
Elf Aquitaine, an oil and gas company, “paid secret ‘commissions’ to African 
officials with the blessing of French governments.”162 Additionally, Elf expanded 
beyond former French colonies into Angola and Nigeria in order to increase oil 
                                                
160 Kenneth B. Noble, “French Devaluation of African Currency Brings Wide Unrest,” The New York 
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http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/23/world/french-devaluation-of-african-currency-brings-wide-
unrest.html?pagewanted=all. 
161 Peggy Hollinger, “Foreign Relations: Life Become More Competitive for the French,” The 
Financial Times, June 4, 2012, accessed January 30, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/2b665aae-ae5b-
11e1-b842-00144feabdc0. 
162 Lucy Ash, “Breaking France’s Africa habit,” BBC News, April 1, 2007, accessed October 27, 2016, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6511963.stm. 
 
73 
revenues. Under the Mitterrand administration, Elf was accused of funneling money 
back to France in order to sponsor politicians who could provide support for their 
corrupt practices throughout Africa. Elf also supported African government budgets 
and contributed 70 percent of Gabon’s budget based on the oil royalties from the 
country’s wells and offshore drilling sites.163 In the early 2000s, 37 former Elf 
managers were charged with embezzlement; however, no politicians were charged 
and branches of the French government have been uncooperative by claiming Elf was 
subject to “secrecy laws.”164 Since this corruption scandal, Elf was acquired and 
privatized by another French company, Total. The privatization of the French national 
company meant that many of the charges were dropped and only a few executives 
were convicted. Total has since resumed Elf’s activities among French and African 
politicians and maintains a strong influence in the oil-rich areas of West and 
Equatorial Africa. This official, yet covert, network created economic incentives for 
adopting “Frenchness,” which France then rewarded with aid allocations and debt 
relief.  
In addition to this extensive oil network, French corporations extend their 
market reach into goods and services, as well as a supply of what could be considered 
as state-sponsored services. The French provide water and electricity as well as the 
telecommunications networks in Senegal and other West African countries.165 Orange 
Telecom, which belongs to the telecommunications industry, is a dominant French 
multinational corporation with deep roots in African markets. Orange typically has a 
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third of the telecommunications sector in Africa nations, in which it operations. At 
the beginning of 2017, Orange “Money” implemented a program that allows those in 
France to transfer money using their mobile device to contacts in Africa, specifically 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal.166 Money transfers, like M-PESA in Kenya, are 
popular in Africa as many lack access to typical banking services. Orange “Money” 
illustrates the number of African migrants in France.  
Extracting much of Africa’s natural resource wealth, Areva conducts mining 
operations for nuclear power. The operations of Areva are vital to French foreign and 
domestic interests as France is dependent on nuclear power for nearly three-quarters 
of its electricity, much of which is found in Niger.167 Despite the colonial relationship, 
in 2014, the Niger government attempted to diminish the special, yet disadvantageous, 
trade deals with France by proposing a cut in tax breaks and an increase in the royalty 
rate.168 Areva revenues average around 10 billion euros each year, which would be a 
significant boost for Niger’s economy if royalty rates were to be increased. However, 
it is not clear if such rate has been implemented, yet its proposal contributes to an 
understanding of the power of African heads of state and corporate executives to alter 
the power balance of Françafrique. 
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Economic relationship 
In addition to the aforementioned policies and organizations, France also 
favors economic resources and “gives priority to African countries that sell oil 
(Angola, Nigeria, etc.) or uranium (Niger) and those that can buy hitech [sic] 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, South Africa)” goods from France.169 Table 2.2. 170 
illustrates the extensive economic relations between France and much of Africa 
through the imports and exports of 2015. Relations with Côte d’Ivoire are 
advantageous as the country is an exporter of coffee and cocoa, as well as petroleum. 
In 2015, French exports to Côte d’Ivoire totaled at €1.02billion with imports at 
€772million, which was a 10.8% increase from a year prior.171 
Economic prioritization differs from French development assistance, which is 
based off of the identity of the African state rather than the potential resources that 
could be extracted. Additionally, African states respond to Françafrique in various 
ways based on their relationship with France; those who agree with the foreign aid 
assistance view it as “an irreplaceable instrument for holding on to power: a 
guarantee against democratic change, a sign of presidency for life, indeed, a promise 
of inheriting power.”172  
                                                
169 Boisbouvier, “50 years later.” 
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172 Boisbouvier, “50 years later.” 
 
76 
In an attempt to fulfill the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, 
France has listed sixteen priority countries, most of which are former colonies, and 
will extensively promote development in these countries.173  
Table 2.2. Exports and imports with France 
Country Exports to France 
Percent of 
total exports 
Imports from 
France 
Percent of total 
imports 
Algeria $6.7B 10% $7.5B 12% 
Benin $26.4M 1.2% $1.91B 5.2% 
Burkina Faso $69.1M 2% $387M 11% 
Cameroon $317M 5.4% $789M 9.8% 
Central African 
Republic $3.71M 5.1% $64.7** 16% 
Chad $7.08M 0.3% $162M 13% 
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of*** 
$14.8M 0.2% $205M 3.2% 
Congo, Republic 
of $310M 2.8% $759M 15% 
Côte d’Ivoire $1.01B 7.1% $1.4B 12% 
Djibouti $1M 0.3% $89.8M 3% 
Equatorial 
Guinea*** $900M 7.7% $134M 6.1% 
Gabon $150M 2% $885** 22% 
Guinea-Conakry $108M 3.5% $171M 5% 
Guinea-
Bissau*** $549k 0.2% $11.9M 3% 
Madagascar $534M* 21% $252M 7.8% 
Mali $11.7M 1.4% $452M** 15% 
Mauritania $85.1M 2.2% $320M 6% 
Mauritius*** $379M* 13% $433M 7.4% 
Morocco $5.05B 18% $5.84B 13% 
Niger $542M* 44% $308M 13% 
Rwanda*** $10.4M 1.2% $37.8M 1.9% 
Senegal $132M 4.5% $1.07B** 14% 
Togo $11.2M 0.6% $966M 7.7% 
Tunisia $5.3B* 33% $4.41B** 19% 
*France holds the largest share of country’s exports 
**France holds the largest share of country’s imports 
***Not a former French colony, but belongs to la Francophonie or uses the CFA franc 
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Senegal is one of the sixteen priority countries that France has targeted for additional 
official development assistance (ODA). France had a trade surplus with Senegal of 
€681 million in 2015, meaning that the economic relationship greater benefit to 
France.174 Most extraordinary in the economic relationship between France and 
Senegal is holdings of French companies in a variety of industries—mining, 
telecommunications, and clubs/restaurants—amounting to nearly 25 percent of 
Senegal’s GDP.175 
Although the trade relationships appear to take away from the importance of 
identity in terms of its aid relationship, this is not the case. There are material benefits 
to Françafrique, but French administrations are more interested in advancing the 
sphere of influence. Trade negotiations often involve interpersonal connections, 
established through years of interaction with other nations’ counterparts, and the 
shared identity can ease the tensions and miscommunications behind difficult trade 
negotiations. At a regional level, countries that are tied economically are less likely to 
face conflict and prefer a relationship that is advantageous to both parties.  
 
Voting in the United Nations 
 In addition to contributing to pré carré, Africa matters to France because 
“Sub-Saharan countries represent one of the largest geographical voting blocs in the 
United Nations, and their support carries useful moral clout—if fewer votes—in other 
international organisations [sic].”176 France offers protection in exchange for votes at 
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the UN and economic ties with French firms.177 For example, France colluded with 
the US on intervention in Iraq and cooperated with Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea, 
as they were among the rotating members of the UNSC.178 Furthermore, support from 
African heads of state supported the intervention in Libya under Gaddafi and the 
election of Christine Lagarde as the head of the International Monetary Fund.179 
 However, France also advocates for interventions in sub-Saharan Africa as 
Sarkozy chaired a UN Security Council meeting focused on Sudan and Somalia in 
2007. This was an attempt to convince the international community that France cares 
about more than simply French-speaking Africa.180 Because African nations represent 
a significant voting bloc of the United Nations, the maintenance of the French-
African relationship and the “Frenchness” identity leads to African support for French 
policies. Repeatedly French officials make an effort to convince the international 
community that they care about more than Francophone Africa.  
 
Scandals of Françafrique 
The various channels of Françafrique have most often fostered a shared 
understanding of identity between French and African actors. However, scandals have 
damaged the relative level of “Frenchness” in several countries, especially Rwanda 
and more recently, Gabon. Due to these scandals, governments and nongovernmental 
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organizations in Africa have criticized the role of the French and, in extreme cases, 
expelled any assistance in terms of technical, military, and economic.  
Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, France was accused of assisting 
President Habyarimana and the Hutu rebels in their heinous crimes. Although not 
directly involved in the mass killings, France provided arms to rebels and helped to 
evacuate the assassinated president’s wife, Hutu politicians, and other war 
criminals.181 Despite French troops being among the first UN peacekeeping forces in 
Rwanda, the current Kagame administration still harbors anger for their possible 
contributions in the genocide.182 In 2006, Rwanda kicked out all French diplomats. In 
2009, Kagame changed the official language from French to English overnight and 
joined the British Commonwealth. President Kagame never learned to speak French 
as he grew up in Uganda in English-speaking schools and claimed that his intentions 
are to increase trade and relations with the rest of East Africa, who speak English.183 
France has vastly decreased foreign aid to Rwanda after being kicked out of the 
country and embarrassed on an international stage. 
Tensions arose between Gabon and its former colonizer in 2009, when France 
supported the election of the former president’s son, Ali Bongo, among protests from 
Gabonese citizens. In addition to this, Transparency International has investigated 
claims that the Bongo family and other African leaders have maintained vast amounts 
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of wealth within France.184 Despite such close economic ties with France, Gabon 
changed its official language from French to English in October 2012, claiming that it 
is in response to French injustices that failed to remove Ali Bongo and allowed for 
the Bongo family to accumulate wealth reserves and luxury acquisitions in France.185 
Furthermore Ali Bongo claims that “he does not enjoy the close personal 
relationships with French politicians that his father cultivated” and may continue to 
lessen these ties in the future.186 
France has been criticized for supporting undemocratic regimes, especially 
decade-long presidents or human rights violations. Despite criticism of France as 
“tepid” and impartial to justice, French ministers have failed to change their efforts to 
further “Frenchness” via the channels of Françafrique.187 However, Nicolas Sarkozy 
made some efforts to reform the Françafrique network and closed the African cell as 
an official part of the French government.188 But under the administration of François 
Hollande, the usual networks and secrecy of Françafrique resumed.  
 
                                                
184 Transparency International France, “TI-France Re-Files Complaint Targeting Assets Held in 
France by Five African Heads of State,” Transparency International France, July 9, 2008, accessed 
January 15, 2017, 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20080709_ti_france_re_files_complaint_targeting_ass
ets_held_in_france 
185 Agnès Poirier, “Gabon’s French Rejection Hits Us Where It Hurts,” The Guardian, October 12, 
2012, accessed January 27, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/12/gabon-
french-rejection-hurts. 
186 The Economist, “A French-African Quarrel with the Former Coloniser,” January 26, 2016, 
accessed January 20, 2017, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21689216-former-
colony-and-coloniser-grouse-cling-tight 
187 Matt Wells, “François Hollande’s ‘Change’ Is More of the Same on Côte d’Ivoire,” Human Rights 
Watch, February 6, 2013, accessed April 17, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/06/francois-
hollandes-change-more-same-cote-divoire. 
188 Brian Eads, “France Is Slowly Reclaiming Its Old African Empire,” Newsweek, October 30, 2014, 
accessed April 20, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/france-slowly-reclaiming-its-old-
african-empire-280635.html. 
 
81 
Conclusion  
 Although subject to scandal and international criticism in recent years, 
Françafrique is not dead and still permeates the political, economic, and social lives 
of Africans. Françafrique, as a covert network and official French policy in Africa, 
has led to the continuation of shared identity where “Frenchness” was established 
during the colonial period. However, this neocolonialist approach differs from la 
mission civilisatrice because African heads of state possess more sovereignty and 
agency to accept or reject French intervention and foreign aid contributions. In most 
instances of rejection of French-imposed identity, African heads of states and 
domestic populations expel French presence and France retaliates by pulling its 
foreign aid. However, France rewards former colonies that accept French presence 
based on a shared understanding of identity and role in the neo-French Empire. 
In recent years, French officials and corporations have expanded the reach of 
Françafrique in an attempt to extend their existing sphere of influence in to non-
former French colonies. This is evident in various channels including the CFA franc 
zone, membership in la Francophonie, and the participants at the Franco-African 
summits. Although not extensively analyzed in this chapter, the extension of 
Françafrique is included in the “Frenchness” index, which will be presented in 
Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3: Identity as a Determinant in Aid Allocation 
 
The previous two chapters illustrated how “Frenchness” was first created in 
the colonies and how this identity has been perpetuated through the policy of 
Françafrique. In this chapter, I will test the hypothesis that France gives aid based on 
the level of “Frenchness” present in an African country, both historically and 
contemporarily.189 While a substantial literature review was provided on French 
colonial history and the establishment of a French identity, I will now detail the 
important economic theories about why countries provide aid. Most economists 
debate whether aid is based on altruism or strategic interests, with the overwhelming 
majority leaning towards strategic interests. An additional component of this 
literature asks to whom does each donor provide aid. I will contribute to the existing 
research by addressing how France uniquely allocates aid. I will argue that 
“Frenchness” does predict how France disproportionately favors nation-states based 
on their shared identity. This chapter is along the same lines as the paper “Who Gives 
Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”, in which Alesina and Dollar (2000) establish that 
past colonial powers favor their former colonies in providing bilateral aid. However, 
my analysis is unique in that I primarily investigate how France specifically allocates 
aid rather than donor countries as a whole. 
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As I have established in the previous two chapters and will continue to expand 
upon in the subsequent analysis, this research is important because it also contributes 
to the existing literature on the salience and persistence of history.190 However, the 
specific relationship between variations in French colonial rule has not yet been 
analyzed. Because of this persistence of history, we expect the colonial relationship to 
have ramifications for “Frenchness” and current French aid policies towards former 
colonies. The existing literature on the prominence of the French colonial empire 
instead identifies other economic relationships, such as investment and trade. More 
specifically, French colonial public investments—education, health, and 
infrastructure—can “explain about 30 percent of the corresponding current 
performance” in regions where France most heavily invested.191 In addition to public 
investment, which is possibly correlated with the number of European settlers, the 
trade relationship between France and Africa is stronger as the number of settlers 
increases.192 However, the relationship is often one of exploitation as the imports of 
raw material are more affected than manufactured goods.193 Because I expand on this 
literature, I expect for the colonial relationship and the formation of identity to be a 
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key factor in determining aid, especially if aid is distributed based on the strategic 
interests of the donor country. It is important to note that the relationship between 
colonial history and investment trade does not detract from my overall argument that 
a common French identity is the main determinant of bilateral aid committed because 
prior studies fail to consider identity as a potential explanation. Additionally, I control 
for such factors and elaborate on the robustness of “Frenchness” in the results section 
of this chapter.  
Following the section on background literature, the second section will outline 
the data used for regression analysis. Then I will present my results and hypothesis 
tests in which I argue that France gives aid to former and non-former colonies based 
on their level of Frenchness. Finally, I will offer conclusions on my research.  
 
Background Literature 
Critics of aid claim that donor countries often fail to evaluate the needs of 
recipient countries and frequently overlook the opportunity to support good 
governance through aid. France has been especially accused of such behavior, as was 
illustrated with Gabonese examples in the previous chapter, where France allowed the 
ruling Bongo family to hide their wealth in France⎯wealth that was possibly the 
result of large foreign aid receipts. Even with the rise in popularity of aid 
conditionalities that encourage good governance, France has instead favored allies, 
often former colonies or governments with a reputation of corruption. Previous 
economic scholarship finds that donor countries prioritize strategic interests—
including sphere of influence, trade benefits, and UN voting affinity—over recipient 
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needs.194 Rather than using aid as a tool to address poverty, increase economic growth, 
and promote good governance, donor countries use bilateral aid to further their own 
interests. These interests can be both political and economic.  
Politically, donor countries use aid to show allegiances and may expect 
reciprocation in the form of UN voting or other agreements at the international 
level.195 This strategic motivation for providing aid applies to many, if not the 
majority of, donor countries, as the United States gives aid to Israel, with whom they 
have an extensive, interventionist history. The two major colonial empires—Great 
Britain and France—provide more aid to countries where they have a “relatively long 
colonial past.” 196 Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that France disproportionately 
favors former colonies, even more so than its counterparts in other parts of Europe. 
Because of this favoritism, I expect there to be variation among former French 
colonies that receive aid based on their relationship with the former metropole. There 
is some debate on whether or not the end of the Cold War has altered the importance 
of strategic interests in aid allocation, as the competition for alignment with the First 
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and Second Worlds has lessened.197 However, historically, political interests have 
provided a motivation for aid, and therefore, political factors, like measurements of 
democracy and autocracy using Polity IV data, are included in the analysis of French 
aid allocation.  
Aside from the benefits that donors receive from aid allocation, bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies claim that recipient countries share in the potential gains, in 
addition to receiving monetary assistance. Some of these potential benefits include 
economic growth, poverty alleviation, expansion of human rights protections, a 
decrease in corruption, and the promotion of democratic norms. However, the 
existing scholarship does not illustrate that bilateral donors take these recipient 
benefits into account when determining who gets what amount of aid or if aid actually 
yields these various improvements. 198  Furthermore, these potential benefits are 
frequently missed opportunities as aid is fungible and typically allocated to 
governments, which often fail to distribute aid dollars among its citizens that are often 
in need of aid relief. These problems of distribution and accountability help provide 
an explanation for why bilateral donors frequently disregard benefits to recipients, 
especially at the subnational level.  
Former French colonies are especially unique in their economic relationship 
with France, as many of them belong to the CFA franc zone – either in French West 
                                                
197 Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?" The 
American Economic Review 92.4 (2002): 1131; Per Lundborg, "Foreign Aid and International Support 
as Gift Exchange," Economics and Politics 10.2 (1998): 140; Svensson, “Aid Growth and 
Democracy,” 294.  
198 Alesina and Weder, "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?”; David Dollar and 
Victoria Levin, "The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2003," World Development 32.12 
(2006): 2034-2046; Stephen Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?"  International Studies 
Quarterly 48.1 (2004): 251-266; Maizels and Nissanke (1984); Eric Neumayer, "Is Respect for Human 
Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows" Human Rights 
Quarterly 25.2 (2003): 510-527; Svensson, “Aid, Growth, and Democracy.” 
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Africa or French Equatorial Africa. Burnside and Dollar (2000) established that this 
currency zone receives “special treatment from France” in terms of aid allocations.199 
Additionally, closer proximity in terms of geography is also an important factor in aid 
allocation.200 Furthermore, population density and income play a role, although the 
level of income (low, middle, high) necessary for aid is up for debate.201 Although 
these demographics partially determine aid allocation, the primary focus of this 
chapter will be to use the strategic interests of donor countries, namely France. The 
relationship between the political formation of identity and aid will be highlighted in 
the analysis below.  
 
Data and Methodology 
I will use regression analysis to examine aid allocation between (1) France and all 
countries in Africa and (2) France and former French colonies in Africa. My 
dependent variable is the log of bilateral aid committed from the donor to recipient 
country, and my independent variable is an index of “Frenchness.” I use bilateral aid 
flows from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database for the 
years 1973-2010.202 Although OECD collects data on most donor and recipient 
country pairs, my analysis is restricted to a single donor (France) and recipients in 
Africa, as this is the relationship of interest based on the historical ties presented in 
                                                
199 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid Policies, and Growth,” The American Economic Review 
90.4 (2000): 850. 
200 Neumayer, “Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded?” 101. 
201 J.M. Dowling and Ulrich Hiemenz, “Biases in the Allocation of Foreign Aid: Some New 
Evidence,” World Development 13.4 (1985): 535-541; Paul Isenman, "Biases in Aid Allocations 
Against Poorer and Larger Countries," World Development 4.8 (1976): 631-641. 
202 Although aid flows are available prior to 1973, the data is somewhat sporadic in terms of missing 
data. Additionally, the time variant variables are of primary interest in the 1970s. In order to maintain 
the highest level of observations, the data begins in 1973.  
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the previous two chapters.203 My overall objective is to explain how France behaves 
towards African aid recipients—both former colonies and non-colonies—based on 
the level of Frenchness calculated for each country. Frenchness is calculated using the 
principal component analysis from the following variables: 
• number of years as a French colonial possession 
• type of possession – colony, department, mandate, or protectorate 
• presence of unique colonial status at the individual level – originaires, métis, 
or tirailleurs 
• if the president was a member of the French Assembly prior to independence 
• membership in either CFA franc zone 
• percentage of the population that speaks French (lingua franca) 
• membership in La Francophonie 
• if the legal origins are French 
• if France has militarily intervened within the country’s borders 
• if France maintains a permanent military base if the legal origins are French in 
nature.204 
The principal component analysis creates an index that is a linear combination of the 
uncorrelated variables that contains most of the variance. More information on the 
source of the data is detailed in the Appendix. In addition to constructing Frenchness  
 
                                                
203 For more detailed information on how DAC measures bilateral aid flows, see the Appendix 
204 Although additional channels of Françafrique were presented in the previous chapter, data 
constraints have limited my ability to use regression analysis for such channels. When I include these 
additional channels, my sample size is significantly restricted. Moreover, data for things like the 
number of students attended higher education institutions in France is not consistent overtime. Because 
of these constraints, I instead use the channels presented in this list. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Frenchness Variables   
Years under French rule 41.8 (60.3) 
Colony 0.35 (0.48) 
Department 0.02 (0.15) 
Protectorate 0.04 (0.2) 
Mandate 0.05 (0.21) 
Originaires 0.02 (0.15) 
Metis 0.32 (0.59) 
Tirailleurs 0.49 (0.69) 
If a president was a member of the French 
Assembly prior to independence 0.14 (0.35) 
CFA franc zone 0.299 (0.46) 
Percentage of the population who speaks French 
(2010) 15.83 (22.18) 
Membership in La Francophonie 0.56 (0.49) 
Presence of a military base 0.098 (0.298) 
If France has ever militarily intervened in the 
country 0.13 (0.34) 
   
Economic variables   
Total bilateral aid committed, in millions of USD 70.7 (14.9) 
Total multilateral aid committed to recipient 
country, in millions of USD 314 (416) 
Real GDP, in billions USD (constant at 2010 
prices) 25.03 (56.32) 
   
Political variables   
External war indicator 0.008 (0.09) 
Civil war indicator 0.048 (0.215) 
Number of years in current regime 17.72 (12.9) 
Polity IV score -1.96 (5.83) 
Democracy (dummy) 0.18 (0.39) 
Presence of natural disaster 2.09 (3.66) 
Population, in millions 13.16 (19.84) 
   
Dyadic variables   
Distance between countries 5551 (1939) 
Trade flows, in millions of USD 250 (647) 
UN voting affinity 0.62 (0.07) 
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as an independent variable, I use each of the above listed variables independently in 
order to examine the magnitude or uniqueness of each variable in aid allocation. 
Furthermore, I relate bilateral aid flows to other numerous indicators, 
including economic variables (trade flows and gross domestic product (GDP)), 
political variables (polity score, a dummy for democracy, and the presence of civil 
war), and demographic variables (population density in 1950). I present the summary 
statistics for the Frenchness and other variables inn Table 3.1. These variables 
provide alternate explanations for French aid allocation, while also testing the 
robustness of “Frenchness.”  
Figure 3.1. and Figure 3.2. illustrate the amount of “Frenchness” in each 
African country, both former French colonies and non-colonies In order to simply 
present the information, Figure 3.1. and Figure 3.2. show the mean for each country, 
and therefore the time variance of “Frenchness” is not visually illustrated. 
Additionally, “Frenchness” can be negative or positive. Although it is possible to 
standardize the principal component analysis between 0 and 1, the analysis is still the 
same. A negative “Frenchness” simply means the absence of the composition 
variables. For example, Zimbabwe and Kenya lack “Frenchness” because they also 
lack a colonial relationship with the French colonial empire and are not yet included 
in the policy of Françafrique. However, Equatorial Guinea is less negative than other 
non-colonies because it has adopted the CFA franc as its official currency and is also 
a member of the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie. On the other hand, 
Senegal has the strongest level of “Frenchness,” primarily due to their unique colonial 
and post-colonial relationship with France.  
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Figure 3.1. “Frenchness” index in former colonies 
 
 
Figure 3.2. “Frenchness” index in non-former colonies  
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Results 
In this section, I will present several regressions that explain the variation in 
French bilateral aid flows, including the individual components of the “Frenchness” 
index as well as the “Frenchness” index.205 Overall, my regressions confirm my 
hypothesis that France favors former colonies over non-colonies, especially former 
colonies with an identity more aligned with the French, in terms of culture, language, 
education, etc.  
In Table 3.2., Column (1) reports the raw correlation of “Frenchness” and the 
natural log of bilateral aid committed. The coefficient is positive and significant, 
which implies that the amount of aid received is increasing as “Frenchness” increases. 
In subsequent columns, I implement controls in groups (political, economic, and 
other) with respect to the existing literature. The last column implements all of the 
control variables. From the regression tables, we see that “Frenchness” is robust in 
determining bilateral aid allocation. This confirms my hypothesis that France gives 
aid based on the amount of French identity present. Moreover, the amount of aid 
increases on average by 30 percent with each unit increase of “Frenchness,” created 
using the principal component analysis.  
This table is in agreement with the existing economics literature that gross 
domestic product (GDP), trade, and the presence of democratic norms are important 
factors in determining aid receipts. GDP is both positive and significant, meaning that 
the level of economic development also influences the amount of aid a country 
                                                
205 Although detailed, this section does not present an exhaustive list of results from regression 
analysis, and additional regression tables are listed in the Appendix, including a brief section 
investigating how UN voting affinity (or UN friend according to Alesina and Dollar) relates to 
“Frenchness” and bilateral aid committed.  
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receives. This is both intuitive and in agreement with the economics literature and 
policy makers. However, these results do not significantly lessen the effect of 
“Frenchness.” Although trade is significant, it has a minimal effect on bilateral aid 
committed, which will be further emphasized on in the next section.  
Various political measurements—democracy, Polity IV score, and the age of 
the current regime—have similar effects on bilateral aid flows. The democracy 
variable, which is a dummy variable, is both positive and significant, but again does 
not alter the significance of “Frenchness.” In order to gain a more complete 
understanding of the importance of regime type, I use Polity IV, which ranges from -
10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). Most African states lean towards the negative 
end of the spectrum, which is reported in the summary statistics in Table 3.1. Polity 
IV is in accordance with the democracy dummy as a negative Polity IV score has a 
negative impact on bilateral aid flows. Again, this does not necessarily mean that 
“Frenchness” is not a key determinant in aid allocation but rather than donor 
countries can consider a variety of influences in addition to strategic interests.  
Finally, the age in years of current regime is positive and significant. This 
measure, however, could be slightly related to “Frenchness” because of the length in 
the regimes of former French possessions. Some of these long-term politicians 
include President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal (20 years), President Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire (33 years), and President Omar Bongo of Gabon 
(41 years). As presented in previous chapter, these presidents had special or 
privileged relationships with various French administrations through the channels of 
Françafrique. Because of the nature and scope of these special relationships, the  
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significance of the age of the regime for bilateral aid allocation is not surprising.  
 Because the level of “Frenchness” and historical relationship varies between 
former colony and non-colony, Table 3.3. investigates the relationship between 
“Frenchness” and bilateral aid committed to former colonies only. The exclusion of 
non-colonies is important because I expect “Frenchness” to be strongest within the 
countries that have had repeated interactions with French administrators during both 
colonization and throughout the policy of Françafrique. In this table, we observe, 
again, that “Frenchness” is positive and significant in determining aid allocation. 
Similarly to the previous table, which included all African countries, Table 3.3. is 
robust as additional controls are implemented. Of particular note are the political 
variables—democracy, Polity IV, and the age in years of current regime, which are 
significant determinants of French aid allocation. This is not surprising considering 
the lengthy regimes of several African presidents that maintained a very close 
relationship with France, including Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Felix Houphouet-
Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, and Omar Bongo of Gabon. Furthermore, this regression 
analysis also supports the finding that GDP influences the amount of bilateral aid.  
In order to more fully understand the implications of “Frenchness,” Table 3.4. 
breaks down the channels of Françafrique and the colonial identities and their 
relationship with bilateral aid. From this regression analysis, I observe that the 
variable for years under French rule is significant throughout. This finding is intuitive 
based on identity theory, which stresses that repeated interaction fosters identity 
formation—interactions would be longer and most likely more frequent the longer 
France occupied a specific place. Other variables of significance include the  
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percentage of the population that speaks French (according to the lingua franca), 
membership in la Francophonie or the CFA franc zone, and the presence of a military 
base. Although I would expect French possessions to be significant as a whole, it is 
somewhat surprising that the regional status changes depending on the controls used. 
However, the individual statuses—originaires, métis, and tirailleurs—support the 
notion that proximity with the French identity is important for aid allocation. I suspect 
that regional statuses change based on the other variables present, which may dwarf 
the effects of a specific status. When I pare down the sample to include only former 
colonies, there are issues of collinearity, and many variables are dropped. Because of 
this, I report the regression analysis for only former French possessions in the 
Appendix.206   
 
Other Explanations 
The literature review briefly alludes to other explanations for aid receipts, and 
this section will further elaborate on why trade, specifically, does not provide a 
complete explanation for bilateral aid flows. In addition to being motivated by 
economic growth, poverty, and democracy, donors also consider economic benefits. 
Economic incentives between donors and recipients can be observed in the flow of 
imports and exports, as well as the nature and scope of trade agreements. The 
direction and type of flow is important for understanding the relationship between 
                                                
206 Collinearity, in this instance, is likely due to the number of dummy variables in classifying regional 
statuses—colony, mandate, protectorate, or department. As I pare down my analysis to only colonies, 
these regional statuses are correlated because a former French possession can only have one specific 
status. While this is unfortunate for understanding, which individual components of “Frenchness” are 
significant in determining French bilateral aid commitments, collinearity does not weaken the overall 
argument but rather strengthens the need for using principal component analysis to create an index.  
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donor and recipient, often the former colonizer and colony. Donors benefit from 
importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods to recipients. Distinct 
from other similar donors, France “directs aid preferentially to developing countries 
in which French private investment is concentrated, whether or not they are former 
colonies.”207 This finding, however, does not consider the level of “Frenchness,” as is 
presented throughout this paper. By taking another look at the regression tables 
presented in the previous section, dyadic trade flows between France and aid 
recipients do not have a significant impact on bilateral aid flows. Additionally, the 
coefficient is negative and not distinguishable from zero. Although previous scholars 
have observed that France attempts to facilitate trade with other countries through the 
façade of aid receipts, these analyses do not consider the explanation that France is 
instead rewarding countries for similarities in culture and colonial history.  
 
Conclusion 
I find that “Frenchness” is a significant indicator of bilateral aid allocations 
from France, which also prioritizes former colonies over non-colonies. Additionally, 
an increase in “Frenchness” is manifested through colonial identities and the various 
channels of Françafrique. Overall, this confirms that France prioritizes strategic 
interests or its sphere of influence when allocating aid to recipient countries. My 
results are in agreement with much of the literature that donor countries also consider 
the facilitation of democratic norms and poverty alleviation when disbursing aid. This 
is not to say that these additional considerations are more important than “Frenchness,” 
                                                
207 Maizels and Nissanke, Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries,” 887.  
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but rather that the similarities in identity, as observed through the French language, 
military bases, colonial history, etc. are robust even when we consider alternate 
explanations. As will be further elaborated in the overall conclusion to this thesis, 
policy makers should give proper attention to strategic interests of donors, in addition 
to focusing on conditional aid and the discourse around facilitating democratic norms.  
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Conclusion  
 
 France has historically and contemporarily attempted to maintain its influence 
in African nations through a variety of political tools, including the initial colonial 
policies of assimilation or association and the current expansion of the channels of 
Françafrique. France provides aid based on the shared identity formed through such 
political tools as a reward for cooperation and participation in the French sphere of 
influence. 
This shared identity is rooted in centuries of interaction between French and 
African actors. Variation in statuses, both at the individual person and regional level, 
contributed to a sense of belonging and “Frenchness.” For example, originaires and 
métis possessed unique statuses in the French colonial empire and were able to 
participate in particular aspects of political life, including access to education, voting 
rights, lower level administrative positions, and the like. This participation in the 
political sphere contributed to an understanding of their respective role in the greater 
French Empire. At the regional level, Senegal was the center of administrative life for 
French West Africa, as well as an economic powerhouse for the region. This unique 
status as an administrative colony, in addition to being one of the first places 
colonized, resulted in a close relationship between Senegal and France. The extent of 
this relationship was evident in Senegal’s role in the creation of the French Union. 
Although the French Union failed soon after its inception, several African members—
primarily Leopold Senghor and Felix Houphouët-Boigny—argued for a privileged 
relationship with the former colonial power at the time of independence. These 
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variations make up a significant portion of “Frenchness” and contribute to the greater 
argument that historical identity is a key factor for aid allocation. 
By analyzing the specific channels of Françafrique—the neocolonial, covert 
French policy for network building in Africa—I present further evidence of continued 
interaction between French and African actors post independence. Military bases, the 
CFA franc zone, language, and technical assistance are some of the more important 
channels of Françafrique that were implemented shortly after independence and have 
continued to influence Franco-African relationships today. Françafrique explains 
some of the variation in “Frenchness” because African heads of state often choose to 
abide by such policy and therefore willingly increase interaction with French 
administrators and businessmen. Not all African heads of state have desired a closer 
relationship with France through Françafrique, and these countries possess lower 
levels of “Frenchness” than their cooperative counterparts.  
“Frenchness,” constructed using historical statuses and channels of 
Françafrique, is a significant and positive predictor of French bilateral aid given to 
recipient countries in Africa. “Frenchness” is robust even after implementing the 
controls—economic development, trade, regime type, etc.—that explain variation in 
overall aid receipts in previous economic literature. The difference in findings is 
attributable to the inclusion of identity as a unique indicator. Although previous 
studies consider colonial relationships and UN voting affinity, they fail to provide a 
comprehensive account of historical interactions that, according to my research, have 
a significant effect on aid allocations.  
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Future Research 
 Histories of interaction and therefore identity formation are the dominant 
theme of colonial and world powers. France was not unique in its colonization of 
other countries, but French policy was exceptional due to la mission civilisatrice and 
the continued presence of French advisers after the official end of colonization in the 
1960s. Other colonial powers, notably Great Britain, Belgium, and Portugal, varied in 
their approaches to governance in Africa. Great Britain utilized indirect rule, where 
Africans—often from the minority population—were given power to rule over 
specific areas in British territories. The British Empire rivaled the French Empire in 
terms of sheer number of colonies in Africa.  Because the interaction between British 
and African actors was not as systemic as Franco-African interactions, analyzing the 
presence of British identity in former colonies presents a challenge. However, 
membership in the British Commonwealth may provide a starting point in order to 
generalize that shared identity determines aid allocation.  
Closer to French rule, the Belgians ruled the native population via Belgian 
administrators. However, Belgians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former 
Zaire) predominantly intended to extract natural resources, like rubber, and failed to 
cultivate a relationship with the Congolese. After Françafrique was more fully 
developed, French administrations expanded their reach into both the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Rwanda, as former Belgian colonies share the French 
language. The “Frenchness” index measures the relationship between former Belgian 
colonies and France, but it would be interesting to analyze the “Belgianness” in order 
to better understand the lasting effects of the vastly exploitive history. 
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Unlike other colonial powers, Portugal’s reign in Africa lasted until the mid-
1970s. The Portuguese colonized Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and 
Equatorial Guinea in addition to the islands of Cabo Verde and Säo Tomé and 
Principe. Portugal, as an additional case study for shared identity, is the most 
interesting in terms of other colonial powers, as the concept of empire was contested 
because Portugal and Portuguese territories were considered to be one state with a 
shared language and culture. Again, an index that combined this shared language, 
culture, and history with the modern relationship between Portugal and former 
Portuguese colonies would further test my hypothesis that aid is determined by a 
collective identity.  
 The French style of colonialism and neocolonialism is the ideal case study for 
analyzing the relationship between identity and aid, yet more extensive research in 
other colonial histories may uncover a similar story of shared identity based on 
interaction between Europeans and Africans. This potential theory could likely be 
applied to the United States and its soft power efforts in the postwar era. Furthermore, 
the former Soviet Union had a unique relationship with Eastern European and Central 
Asian states in the Cold War. Although not technically colonial history, the former 
USSR diffused ideologies and possibly identity to satellite states. By analyzing the 
effects of identity on aid in a more global sense, I can draw additional policy 
implications for future development and aid relationships.  
In addition to this expansion on identity-aid relationships, I would like to 
further investigate Françafrique. The Franco-African summit of 2003 included the 
Zimbabwean dictator, Robert Mugabe, and this invitation was harshly criticized. 
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Additionally, French influence has gained traction in neighboring West African 
countries, like Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, which have joined the CFA 
franc zone. These are the beginning signs of Françafrique expansion into Anglophone 
Africa, which lacks the common colonial history and shared language. How has and 
will the policy of Françafrique adapt to this new environment? And what is the 
possibility of a stronger “Frenchness” in the future?  
Under the current political climate of rising nationalism and fear of 
immigration, how will the policy of Françafrique, which is often criticized as an 
object of the past, remain or change under future French presidents? If elected, 
Marine Le Pen has declared an end to Françafrique and the CFA franc zone, but prior 
presidential candidates have made similar claims and failed to end the neocolonial 
approach to influence in Africa. Other presidential candidates have either failed to 
state their stance on Françafrique or come from similar political backgrounds as 
previous presidents, meaning they are unlikely to alter the current policy. If 
Françafrique comes to an end, what will this mean for future relationships between 
France and African countries, especially in terms of aid allocation?  
 
Policy Implications 
If donor countries provide aid based on strategic interests and more 
specifically a shared identity, how does this alter the current discourse on aid 
allocation? State behavior is driven by identity, and this behavior facilitates the 
emergence of international norms. International norms and identity are mutually 
constitutive. If this is true, then it is possible for prioritization of strategic interests 
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over all other donor factors to lead to future norms. If the French norm for giving 
based on identity becomes an international norm, then the discourse around 
facilitating democratic norms and support of human rights could fade away.   
Instead of supporting the increase of human rights, democratic norms, and 
overall well-being, donor countries, notably France, are instead acting in self-interest 
and preservation of influence. Although other scholars have identified the importance 
of strategic interests, few have evaluated the potential implications for future 
policy.208 It is important to compile a list of all donor motivations in order to better 
analyze why aid has been so ineffective in contributing to economic development. If a 
donor country disregards the importance of economic growth or human rights and 
only prioritizes strategic influence, then it is no surprise that low-income countries are 
only slightly better off. If the global consensus is to improve development conditions 
in low-income countries, then it is crucial to understand why aid is ineffective, 
especially if this inefficiency resides in donor motivations.  
 
  
                                                
208 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5.1 (2000): 33-63; Jean-Claude Berthelemy, “Bilateral donors’ interest vs. 
recipients’ development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same?” Cahiers de Maison 
des Sciences Economiques (2005): 1-36; Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, “What determines 
foreign aid? The donors’ perspective,” Journal of Development Economics 87 (2008): 1-13; Paul 
Collier and David Dollar, “Aid allocation and poverty reduction,” European Economic Review 46 
(2002): 1475-1500; Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, “Motivations for Aid to Developing 
Countries,” World Development 12.9 (1984): 879-900; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, “The French Aid 
Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964-70,” 
Development and Change 3(1978): 459-78; Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” 
Economics and Politics (1985): 275-297; Javed Younas, “Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: 
Altruism or trade benefits,” European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008): 661-674. 
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Appendix A 
Glossary 
 
 
ancien combattants: combat veterans in the tirailleurs  
 
ancien militaires: career soldiers in the tirailleurs 
 
Assemblée National: National Assembly 
 
assimilés: assimilated; Africans who had denounced their native culture and adopted 
the French language, culture, and institutions 
 
assimilation: assimilation; the French colonial policy that forced Africans to speak 
the French language and abide by French laws and institutions 
 
association: association; the French colonial policy following assimilation that 
argued for development within African culture  
 
cellule africaine: African cell; office in the French government that enacted the policy 
of Françafrique 
 
chefs de canton: African district chiefs who reported to French colonial officials 
 
citoyenneté dans le statut: citizenship status  
 
colons: French settlers, see pieds-noirs 
 
Conseil de l’Entente: Council of Entente; a French West African regional cooperation 
formed near the end of colonialism in 1959 
 
des intérêt français: French interests 
 
état-civil: civil registry; government records for citizenship and various certificates 
(birth, death, marriage, etc.) 
 
évolués: evolved, Africans who were educated in French schools yet did not have the 
political rights of assimilés 
 
exception française: French exceptionalism 
 
Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération: Fund for Aid and Cooperation, development fund 
that replaced FIDES and included military assistance 
 
Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social: Investment 
Fund for Economic and Social Development, FIDES; the French development fund 
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that financed projects in the colonies in the immediate postwar years. FIDES altered 
the financial structure as colonies were not longer financially responsible for 
themselves.  
 
forces de presence: military presence in former French colonial possessions 
 
forces de souveraineté: sovereign military in French territories, such as French 
Guyana and Antilles 
 
indigénat: native courts under French colonialism, African sujets were subject to 
these courts and often faced harsh punishments for minor crimes 
 
Institut Français: French Institute, a center for cultural understanding located in 
Dakar, Senegal 
 
jus soli: citizenship by soil; metropolitan and colonial soil did not confer the same 
kind of nationality 
 
liberté, égalité, et fratenité: the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity enshrined 
in the French Constitution  
 
loi cadre: Reform Act; transfer of powers from France to African colonies 
 
la mission civilisatrice: the civilizing mission; French approach to colonization in 
Africa was to educate the natives and turn them into civilized, rational men.  
 
métis: mixed, mulatto; a status granted to mixed Africans (one French and one 
African parent) who had political rights during colonization because they possessed 
French blood 
 
mise en valeur: development or improvement of both natural and human resources 
 
Missions de Coopération et d’Action Culturelle: Mission for Cooperation and 
Cultural Action; aid through technical assistance and advisors 
 
Mission Militaire de Coopération: Mission for Military Cooperation; aid given 
through military assistance and equipment 
 
Organization Internationale de la Francophonie: International Organization of la 
Francophonie; institution for states whose population speaks French 
 
originaires: originals, a unique citizenship status granted to Africans residing in the 
Four Communes 
 
pieds-noirs: black feet, referring to Frenchmen who were born in Algeria when it was 
a French department  
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plein droit: full rights; a mechanism for Africans to obtain French citizenship 
 
pré carré: backyard, France’s sphere of influence  
 
Quatre Communes: Four Communes—Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisuqe, and Dakar—
that had special privileges in the colonial empire 
 
reseaux: network, referring to the networks of Françafrique 
 
signares: elite African women, often had relations with French colonial 
administrators 
 
spahis: all Arab regiments who fought in the French army 
 
sujets: subjects, the most basic level of status in the French colonial empire; subjects 
had duties rather than rights 
 
tirailleurs (Sénégalaise): French African soldiers; originally from Senegal but later 
recruited from all French colonies during the world wars 
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Abbreviations 
 
AEF  Afrique Équatoriale Française, French Equatorial Africa 
 
AOF  Afrique Occidentale Française, French West Africa 
 
DAC  OECD Development Assistance Committee 
 
EU  European Union 
 
FAC  Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération  
 
FIDES  Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social 
 
GDP gross domestic product  
 
GNI gross national income 
 
MC Ministry of Cooperation and Development 
 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
OIF Organization Internationale de la Francophonie 
 
UN United Nations 
 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
 
XAF Central African CFA franc 
 
XOF West African CFA franc 
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Appendix B 
Dependent Variable Measurement: ODA Bilateral Aid Committed 
 
 
 
The DAC database lists Official Development Assistance (ODA) from donor 
countries to recipient countries. Specifically this includes assistance “(i) provided by 
official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which: (a) is administered with the promotion of 
the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; 
and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per 
cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).”209 However, ODA does not 
include bilateral or multilateral spending in the form of military, peacekeeping, 
social/cultural programs (museums, sport training facilities, etc.), anti-terrorism 
activities, and some forms of nuclear energy and research activities. ODA flows are 
measured in the form of cash or commodities and services; however, loans for less 
than a year are not counted in aid flows.   
 
  
                                                
209 OECD, “Is It ODA: Factsheet – November 2008,” accessed April 12, 2017, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf, 1. 
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Appendix C 
Sources of Data 
 
 
Table C.1. Summary of data 
 
Variable Description Source 
age of regime Number of years a current regime has been in place. 
Cheibub, José Antionio, Jennifer 
Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 
“Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Data.” 
Public Choice 142.2 (2010): 67-101.  
aid committed Amount of aid committed to recipient, 2009 USD 
OECD. “Technical guide to DAC 
statistics database.” OECD aid statistics 
2014. Accessed July 2014, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide
.htm; Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. 
Nielson, and Darren G. Hawkins.  
“More dollars than sense: refining our 
knowledge of development finance 
using AidData.” World Development 
39 (2011): 1891-906.  
CFA franc 
Dummy variable by year; 
1 if country was a member 
of the CFA franc zone 
Hadjimichael, Michael T. and Michel 
Galy. “The CFA Franc Zone and the 
EMU.” IMF Working Paper 
WP/97/156 (1997).  
colony 
Dummy variable; 1 if 
regional status was French 
colony, 0 otherwise 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation: Remaking France 
and French Africa, 1945-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014.  
democracy 
Dummy variable: 1 if 
country is a democracy, 0 
otherwise 
Cheibub, José Antionio, Jennifer 
Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 
“Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Data.” 
Public Choice 142.2 (2010): 67-101. 
department 
Dummy variable; 1 if 
regional status was French 
department, 0 otherwise 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation: Remaking France 
and French Africa, 1945-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. 
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distance 
between 
capitals 
Simple distance between 
capitals (capitals, km) 
Mayer, Theirry and Soledad Zignago. 
“Notes on CEPII's Distances Measures: 
the Geodist Database.” CEPII Working 
Paper 25. (2011). Centre d'Etudes 
Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationals, Paris.  
external war Recipient External War 
Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk.  
Correlates of War Project Trade Data 
Set Codebook, Version 3.0. 2012. 
Accessed August 18, 2014. 
http://correlatesofwar.org. 
French 
Assembly 
If a head of state served 
on the French Assembly 
prior to independence 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation: Remaking France 
and French Africa, 1945-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. 
internal war Recipient Internal War 
Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk.  
Correlates of War Project Trade Data 
Set Codebook, Version 3.0. 2012. 
Accessed August 18, 2014. 
http://correlatesofwar.org. 
interventions 
Dummy variable by year; 
1 if French troops were 
present in country, 0 
otherwise 
Bender, Jeremy. “France’s Military is 
All Over Africa.” Business Insider. 
January 22, 2015, accessed April 1, 
2017. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/france
s-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1 
la 
Francophonie  
Dummy variable by year; 
1 if country was a member 
of Organization 
Internationale de la 
Francophonie (OIF), 0 
otherwise 
“Welcome to the International 
Organisation of La Francophonie’s 
Official Website.” Organisation 
Internaitonale de la Francophonie. 
Accessed April 14, 2017. 
http://www.francophonie.org/Welcome
-to-the-International.html. 
legal origins If the legal origins: French civil law 
LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. “The 
Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origines.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 46.2 (2008): 285-332. 
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mandate 
Dummy variable; 1 if 
regional status was French 
mandate, 0 otherwise 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation: Remaking France 
and French Africa, 1945-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. 
métis 
Variable between 0 and 2 
based on the number of 
métis throughout the 
colonial period 
Saada, Emmanuelle. Empire’s 
Children: Race, Filiation, and 
Citizenship in the French Colonies. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012. 
military base 
Dummy variable; 1 if 
military base is les forces 
de présence or occupied 
by French troops, 0 
otherwise 
“Les Forces Françaises 
Prépositionnées, Mai 2016.” Ministère 
de la Défense. January 31, 2017. 
Accessed April 14, 2017. 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces
-prepositionnees/mission-des-forces-
prepositionnees/missions-des-forces-
prepositionnees. 
natural 
disasters 
Indicator for if recipient 
had any type of disaster 
Guha-Sapir, D. R. Below, Ph. Hoyois. 
EM-DAT. “The OFDA/CRED 
international disaster database.” 
Université catholique de Louvain, 
Brussels, Belgium. 2012. Accessed 
June 2013. http://www.emdat.be. 
originaires  
Dummy variable as 
originaire was only a 
status in Senegal, 0 
otherwise 
Crowder, Michael. Senegal: A Study in 
French Assimilation Policy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962. 
percentage 
French  
Using the lingua franca 
data, I calculated the 
population speaking 
French in each country 
Britannica. Britannica Book of the Year 
2010. Chicago: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc. 2010.  
Polity IV 
Measurement of most 
autocratic (-10) to most 
democratic (10) 
Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr. 
and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: 
Data Users' Manual, Vienna, VA: 
Center for Systemic Peace, 2012.  
population 
 
Feenstra, R.C., Inklaar, R., and 
Timmer, M.P. “The Next Generation of 
the Penn World Table.” 2013. 
Accessed July 2013. 
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http://www.ggdc.net/pwt. 
protectorate 
Dummy variable; 1 if 
regional status was French 
protectorate, 0 otherwise 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation: Remaking France 
and French Africa, 1945-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. 
real GDP  Gross domestic product in terms of 2010 USD 
Feenstra, R.C., Inklaar, R., and 
Timmer, M.P. “The Next Generation of 
the Penn World Table.” 2013. 
Accessed July 2013. 
http://www.ggdc.net/pwt. 
tirailleurs  
Variable between 0 and 2 
based on the number of 
tirailleurs throughout the 
colonial period 
Echenberg, Myron J. Colonial 
Conscripts: the Tirailleurs Sénégalais 
in French West Africa, 1857-1960. 
Portsmouth, NH: Heinneman, 1991.  
trade flows Trade flows between countries (dyadic) 
Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk.  
Correlates of War Project Trade Data 
Set Codebook, Version 3.0 (2012). 
Accessed August 18, 2014. 
http://correlatesofwar.org. 
UN voting 
affinity 
Voting similarity index 
(0-1) using three category 
vote data (yes, abstain, no) 
(dyadic) 
Bailey, Michael, Anton Strezhnev, and 
Erik Voeten. “Estimating Dynamic 
State Preferences from UN Voting 
Data.” Forthcoming Journal of Conflict 
Resolution.  
years of 
possession 
The number of years a 
possession was occupied 
by France 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between 
Empire and Nation: Remaking France 
and French Africa, 1945-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014. 
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Appendix D 
Regression Tables 
 
 
UN Voting 
The following section presents regression analysis to address the argument for 
UN voting affinity presented in “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” 
Alesina and Dollar argue that UN votes are a “reliable indication of the political 
alliances between countries and that these political alliances in part determine aid 
flow.”210 However, other scholars—notably Kuziemko and Werker (2006)—argue 
that members of the UN Security Council, especially the US, give aid to rotating 
members on the Security Council in exchange for votes. The following analysis 
addresses this debate, and I find that UN voting affinity, which is a dyadic variable, 
has a positive and significant effect on bilateral aid committed. This can be seen in 
Table D.1., column (4). Table D.2. shows the regression analysis for former French 
colonies only. Additionally, I ran regressions with UN voting affinity as the 
dependent variable with similar controls from previous analyses. The results are 
presented in Tables D.3. and D.4. 
  
                                                
210 Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of 
Economic Growth, 5.1 (2000): 46. 
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Individual Components of “Frenchness,” Former Colony Only 
 The following section was mentioned in Chapter 3 but not included due to 
issues of collinearity. However, I wanted to illustrate that many variables were 
dropped—most likely due to the coding of regional statuses—and therefore not 
included in the overall analysis. See the results in Table D.5. below. 
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